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ABSTRACT 
  For decades, the immigration adjudication system has been under 
relentless attack from both the left and the right. The left has been 
concerned with the fairness of the proceedings, the accuracy and 
consistency of the outcomes, and the acceptability of both the 
procedures and the outcomes to the parties and to the public. The 
right has focused on the fiscal costs and elapsed times of these 
proceedings. This Article demonstrates that all of these criticisms have 
been well founded and that the roots of the problems are severe 
underfunding, reckless procedural shortcuts, the politicization of the 
process, and a handful of adjudicators personally ill suited to the task. 
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  Over the years, commentators and commissions have offered 
thoughtful solutions, but consensus has proven elusive. This Article 
calls for redesigning the entire system. For the trial phase, this Article 
endorses previous proposals for converting the current immigration 
judges into administrative law judges, who enjoy greater job security, 
and moving them from the Department of Justice into a new, 
independent executive branch tribunal. For the appellate phase, this 
Article proposes radical surgery, replacing both administrative 
appeals and regional court of appeals review with a single round of 
appellate review by a new, Article III immigration court. The new 
court would be staffed by experienced Article III district and circuit 
judges serving two-year assignments. This new system would 
significantly depoliticize the hiring, judging, supervision, and control 
of immigration adjudicators. It would consolidate the two current, 
largely duplicative rounds of appellate review into one, in the process 
restoring the Article III jurisdiction that Congress stripped away in 
1996. It would save tax dollars and speed the removal process, thus 
reducing not only prolonged detention, but also what some believe is 
a meaningful incentive to file frivolous appeals to delay removal. It 
would preserve both specialized expertise and a generalist perspective. 
And it is politically realistic, permitting all sides to meet the specific 
objectives they hold most dear while requiring each side to make only 
modest concessions. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ...........................................................................................1637 
I.  The Background ...............................................................................1641 
II.  The Problems...................................................................................1644 
A. The Manifestations .............................................................1645 
B. The Causes ...........................................................................1651 
1. Suspect # 1: The Underresourcing of EOIR ................1651 
2. Suspect # 2: The Procedural Shortcuts at the BIA......1657 
3. Suspect # 3: The Politicization of EOIR.......................1665 
4. Suspect # 4: The Bad Apples .........................................1675 
5. A Summary of the Causes..............................................1676 
III.  The Usual Proposed Solutions.....................................................1676 
A. An Article I Immigration Court with Trial and 
Appellate Divisions.............................................................1678 
B. Legislating More Job Security within the Department 
of Justice...............................................................................1681 
C. Converting EOIR into an Independent Tribunal 
outside the Justice Department.........................................1683 
LEGOMSKY IN FINAL.DOC 4/28/2010  5:15:26 PM 
2010] IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION 1637 
IV.  An Article III Immigration Court Staffed by Generalist 
Judges...........................................................................................1685 
A. The Proposal........................................................................1686 
B. Constitutionality..................................................................1687 
C. Policy Benefits and Costs ...................................................1688 
1. Depoliticization ...............................................................1689 
2. Generalists and Specialists .............................................1692 
3. Fix ‘96 ...............................................................................1696 
4. Fiscal Cost and Waste.....................................................1696 
5. Elapsed Time ...................................................................1703 
6. Flexibility..........................................................................1704 
7. Centralization ..................................................................1704 
8. Potential for Consensus..................................................1708 
D. The Details...........................................................................1710 
1. The Trial Phase................................................................1710 
2. The Appellate Phase.......................................................1714 
Conclusion..............................................................................................1720 
INTRODUCTION 
Immigration law presents special complexities. The sheer size 
and chaotic layout of the principal statute and related sources of law 
bewilder specialists and nonspecialists alike. The labyrinth known as 
the Immigration and Nationality Act1 governs the admission of 
noncitizens to the United States, their expulsion from the United 
States, and a host of miscellaneous decisions. Its five hundred pages 
conspire with more than one thousand pages of administrative 
regulations issued by a variety of federal departments,2 as well as 
precedent decisions of administrative tribunals, executive officers, 
and courts, to create a byzantine network of substantive and 
procedural rules of law. The organization of the statute further 
confounds nonspecialists because qualifications to many of its most 
important provisions appear in distant and unexpected places.3 
 
 1. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–537 (2006)). 
 2. E.g., 6 C.F.R. (Department of Homeland Security); 8 C.F.R. (Department of Justice); 
20 C.F.R. (Department of Labor); 22 C.F.R. (Department of State). 
 3. For example, the grounds on which a noncitizen may be deported are listed in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a), but many of the provisions for discretionary relief in these cases are scattered 
throughout the statute. See, e.g., id. §§ 1158, 1182(h), 1229b, 1229c, 1255, 1259. To receive 
asylum, one must be a “refugee,” id. § 1158(b)(1)(A), but the term “refugee” is defined in 
§ 1101(a)(42). The main requirements for the various classes of “nonimmigrant” temporary 
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Moreover, even when the law is otherwise clear, rules that require 
judges to apply broadly worded statutory or regulatory language to 
individualized facts are exceptionally common,4 rendering outcomes 
highly indeterminate. 
The resulting legal complexities and fact-specific uncertainties, in 
turn, generate disputes over the facts, the law, and the many 
discretionary determinations delegated to a range of government 
actors. The sheer number of noncitizens seeking admission or 
resisting deportation,5 combined with the critical interests at stake for 
both the individuals and the public, guarantee that the number of 
disputes will be high. 
This Article focuses on the formal system for adjudicating 
removal cases. These are cases in which the government seeks either 
to deny a noncitizen admission to the United States or to expel a 
noncitizen after arrival.6 Described in Part I, these proceedings 
 
visitors are laid out in § 1101(a)(15), but numerous other requirements for those same 
admissions appear in § 1184. 
 4. Two of the most frequent remedies requested in removal proceedings, for example, are 
asylum and cancellation of removal. The former requires a showing of “refugee” status, id. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(A), which in turn requires a “well-founded fear of persecution,” id. § 1101(a)(42). 
The latter requires a showing of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Id. § 1229b. 
 5. In fiscal year 2008, more than 1.1 million people were admitted to the United States as 
lawful permanent residents, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 5 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://www.dhs. 
gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf, and another 60,000 as refugees, id. 
at 39 tbl.13. There were over 175 million “nonimmigrant” (temporary visitor) admissions. Id. at 
65 tbl.25. In the same fiscal year, the immigration courts received more than 350,000 “matters,” 
mainly removal proceedings. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (EOIR), U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2008 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK B7 fig.2 (2009), available at http://www. 
usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy08syb.pdf. 
 6. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. This is only one of several immigration adjudication systems that 
Congress and the executive branch have constructed. United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security, engages in 
informal adjudication when it decides a wide variety of individual applications for immigration 
benefits, sometimes providing intra-agency appellate review of its decisions. See Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 § 451, 6 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (establishing the Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services and detailing the functions of the agency and its officers); Notice of Name 
Change from the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services to United States Citizenship 
and Immigration Services, 69 Fed. Reg. 60,938 (Oct. 13, 2004). The Department of Labor has its 
own procedures for deciding—and offering review of its decisions denying—applications for 
labor certification, a prerequisite to immigration in certain employment-related admission 
categories. 8 C.F.R. § 212 (2009); 20 C.F.R. § 656 (2009). The State Department has procedures 
for deciding visa applications and, in its discretion, reviewing visa denials by consular officers. 22 
C.F.R. §§ 40–42 (2009). Several entities are involved in the adjudication of citizenship disputes. 
See generally 7 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE (rev. ed. 2009) (covering the law of nationality and 
citizenship, and the process of naturalization). The USCIS asylum officers have procedures for 
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comprise evidentiary hearings before immigration judges in the 
Justice Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(EOIR), appellate review by the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA), also within EOIR, and in certain cases, review by the U.S. 
courts of appeals. Removal proceedings are the centerpiece, and by 
far the most controversial, of the immigration adjudication systems in 
place today. For decades, the system has been under relentless attack 
from both the left and the right. 
As this Article will show, the criticisms are well founded. There 
have been fundamental problems with the fairness of the proceedings, 
the accuracy and consistency of the outcomes, the efficiency of the 
process (with respect to both fiscal resources and elapsed time), and 
the acceptability of both the procedures and the outcomes to parties 
and to the public. This Article argues that the principal sources of 
these problems are severe underfunding, reckless procedural 
shortcuts, the inappropriate politicization of the process, and a 
handful of adjudicators personally ill suited to the task. 
Over the years, commentators have offered thoughtful solutions,7 
but consensus has proved elusive. The various proposals have fallen 
 
adjudicating certain asylum applications. 8 C.F.R. § 208. A truly comprehensive study of 
immigration adjudication in the United States would embrace all of these disparate systems. As 
a consultant to the Administrative Conference of the United States many years ago, I attempted 
such an examination, but only with respect to the appellate phase. See Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 
IOWA L. REV. 1297 (1986). Much of that study has been overtaken by subsequent developments. 
 7. Several reports and other writings have recommended replacing EOIR with an Article 
I immigration court that would have trial and appellate divisions. See APPLESEED, ASSEMBLY 
LINE INJUSTICE: BLUEPRINT TO REFORM AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION COURTS 35–36 (2009), 
available at http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/uploads/view/75/download:1/assembly_line_ 
injustice_june09.pdf; COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, ABA, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION 
SYSTEM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 43–48 (2010), available at http://new.abanet.org/Immigration/ 
Documents/ReformingtheImmigrationSystemExecutiveSummary.pdf; JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, 
ANDREW SCHOENHOLTZ & PHILIP SCHRAG, REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM 
ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 103–04 (2009); SELECT COMM’N ON 
IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST: THE FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 248–50 (1981); Peter J. Levinson, A 
Specialized Court for Immigration Hearings and Appeals, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 644, 651–54 
(1981); Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I 
Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 15–21 (2008); Maurice A. Roberts, 
Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 18–20 (1980);  
Marshall Fitz & Philip Schrag, Proposed Bill to Create an Independent Immigration Court 
System (2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal); see also ABA, 
DAILY JOURNAL: 2010 MIDYEAR MEETING (2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
leadership/2010/midyear/docs/daily_journal.pdf (showing ABA House of Delegates approval of 
Resolutions 114A, B, C, D, and F); Press Release,  ABA, New Report to ABA Addresses Crisis 
Within Immigration Removal System (Feb. 2, 2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/abanet/ 
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victim to structural impediments, funding priorities, and vast political 
chasms that continue to separate the diverse clusters of critics. 
This Article seeks to construct a politically realistic proposal that 
would solve the major problems afflicting immigration adjudication. 
To be politically feasible, the proposal must enable all sides to 
achieve the legitimate goals they consider most important without 
requiring any side to make more than modest concessions. 
My proposal has two parts. The first part would convert current 
immigration judges into administrative law judges (who enjoy greater 
job security) and move them from the Department of Justice into a 
new, independent tribunal. This new tribunal would remain within 
the executive branch but would be located outside all departments of 
the federal government. The second half of my proposal would 
abolish both the BIA and the current role of the regional courts of 
appeals, replacing them with a single round of appellate review by a 
new, Article III immigration court. The new court would be staffed 
by Article III judges drawn from the district courts and the regional 
courts of appeals for two-year assignments. Only judges with at least 
three years of experience on federal courts of general jurisdiction 
would be eligible for such assignments. 
It bears emphasis that restructuring, although essential to reform 
of the immigration adjudication system, is not sufficient. Even a 
perfect adjudication structure, staffed by perfect people, would solve 
only a fraction of what ails immigration adjudication. As discussed 
below, realistic funding is critical. There are, moreover, a number of 
procedural issues that ideally require reform as well. Examples 
 
media/release/news_release.cfm? releaseid=870 (summarizing the ABA Commission on 
Immigration’s proposals); cf. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, 
Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 386 (2007) 
(proposing conversion of the BIA to an Article I court). One study proposed the functional 
equivalent of an Article I court with trial and appellate divisions, also within the executive 
branch and outside the Department of Justice, but preferred not to call it a “court.” See U.S. 
COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, 1997 REPORT TO CONGRESS: BECOMING AN AMERICAN: 
IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 178–82 (1997). Numerous other studies have criticized 
core components of the EOIR adjudication system but without proposing specific restructuring 
options. See, e.g., DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO BONO RE: BOARD 
OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT 
(2003), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf; 
Sydenham B. Alexander III, A Political Response to Crisis in the Immigration Courts, 21 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2006); Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical 
Perspective, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 467 (2008); Lenni B. Benson, You Can’t Get There from Here: 
Managing Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405. 
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include the range of available remedies, access to counsel, the quality 
of interpretation, standards of proof, and the rules concerning 
motions to reopen or reconsider.8 For the most part, these issues are 
beyond the scope of this Article. Though the distinction is not always 
clear-cut, the emphasis here will be on the broad design of the system 
rather than specific procedural ingredients. 
Part I of this Article provides a bare-bones summary of the 
current adjudication system for the removal of noncitizens from the 
United States. Part II identifies and describes the fundamental 
problems with the current system and seeks to diagnose their causes. 
Part III articulates the essential principles that any reform would have 
to follow to remedy the problems discussed in Part II. It then tests 
some of the more significant proposals against those principles, 
finding them to be improvements over the status quo but still not fully 
satisfying. Part IV lays out the details of my proposed solution and 
examines its benefits and costs. 
I.  THE BACKGROUND 
Removal proceedings are the forum for determining whether 
noncitizens should be removed from the United States, either upon 
seeking admission (formerly called exclusion hearings) or after 
admission (formerly called deportation hearings). The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) initiates the proceedings by serving a 
‘‘notice to appear’’ on the noncitizen whom it wishes to remove.9 
DHS is typically represented by an assistant chief counsel in 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an agency of DHS.10 
The noncitizen and DHS are the opposing parties. An immigration 
judge conducts an evidentiary hearing.11 
The immigration judges, based in offices located throughout the 
United States,12 are part of the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge 
(OCIJ). The latter is a component of the Executive Office for 
 
 8. For a thoughtful discussion of the many external contributors to EOIR’s case 
management problems, see generally Benson, supra note 7. 
 9. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1). 
 10. See E-mail from Peter Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, to Author (Aug. 19, 2009) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 11. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1). 
 12. See EOIR, supra note 5, at B3 tbl.1 (listing office locations). Under the EOIR 
“Institutional Hearing Program,” the immigration judges also conduct removal hearings in 
prison facilities. Id. at P1. 
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Immigration Review (EOIR),13 a tribunal within the Department of 
Justice. The immigration judge first determines whether the 
noncitizen is removable under any of the statutorily enumerated 
grounds for inadmissibility14 or deportability.15 If the person is found 
inadmissible or deportable, the immigration judge then decides any 
affirmative applications for relief that the noncitizen has properly 
filed.16 These latter determinations typically entail an initial decision 
whether the person has met the specific statutory prerequisites for the 
relief sought and, if so, whether discretion should be favorably 
exercised. At the conclusion of the hearing, the immigration judge 
renders a decision, either orally or in writing.17 The decision 
culminates in a formal order directing the person’s removal, 
terminating proceedings, or otherwise disposing of the case.18 
Among the mechanisms for affirmative relief are two remedies 
designed specifically to protect the applicant from persecution: 
asylum and a narrower remedy commonly called “withholding of 
removal” (or, by statute, “restriction on removal”).19 Their 
adjudication procedures require brief additional explanation. A 
person who is already in removal proceedings may file a defensive 
application for these remedies with the immigration judge.20 One who 
is not in removal proceedings may file an affirmative application for 
asylum (but not for withholding of removal) with the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).21 If the asylum officer 
is not prepared to grant the application, he or she refers the person 
 
 13. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.9–.10 (2009). 
 14. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). 
 15. Id. § 1227(a). 
 16. See id. § 1229a(c)(4)(A). 
 17. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.13. 
 18. Id. § 1240.12(c). 
 19. Asylum, which is discretionary, enables the recipient to remain in the United States 
and, subject to some limitations, to bring in a spouse and children. 8 U.S.C. § 1158. Withholding 
of removal merely immunizes the person from return to the country in which his or her life or 
freedom is threatened (not from return to a third country), and it makes no provision for the 
admission of family members. See id. § 1231(b)(3). 
 20. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, I-589, APPLICATION FOR 
ASYLUM AND FOR WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL: INSTRUCTIONS 10 (2009), available at http:// 
www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-589instr.pdf. 
 21. See id. at 11; EOIR, supra note 5, at I1. 
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for removal proceedings,22 in which the person may apply de novo to 
the immigration judge.23 
The Justice Department regulations give each of the opposing 
parties the right to appeal the immigration judge’s decision to the 
BIA,24 located in Falls Church, Virginia.25 The filing of the appeal 
automatically stays execution of the immigration judge’s decision.26 
The attorney general created the BIA in 1940,27 names its members, 
determines its procedures, and may review any of its decisions.28 Like 
the immigration judges, the BIA is part of EOIR.29 As a result of 
controversial reforms introduced in 2002 by Attorney General John 
Ashcroft, the BIA decides the vast majority of its cases by single 
members rather than multimember panels, and, in specified 
categories, without providing reasons.30 The BIA reviews the 
immigration judge’s legal conclusions and discretionary decisions de 
novo, but as a result of the 2002 reforms, the BIA may not reverse 
findings of fact, including credibility determinations, unless they are 
“clearly erroneous.”31 
Subject to some broad exceptions enacted in 1996,32 the 
noncitizen has the right to judicial review of the BIA’s decision. The 
exclusive procedure for obtaining such review is a petition for review 
in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the 
removal hearing was held.33 
The three main classes of cases for which judicial review is 
barred are expedited removal orders,34 most discretionary 
 
 22. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1) (assuming inadmissibility or deportability). 
 23. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 10. EOIR 
reports that in fiscal year 2008, immigration judges received over 33,000 such affirmative asylum 
claims and 14,000 defensive claims. EOIR, supra note 5, at I1 fig.13. 
 24. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). 
 25. EOIR, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals, http://www.justice.gov/ 
eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
 26. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(a). 
 27. Regulations Governing Departmental Organization and Authority, 5 Fed. Reg. 3502, 
3503 (Sept. 4, 1940) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003). 
 28. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1. 
 29. Id. § 1003.0(a). 
 30. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 31. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3). 
 32. For a summary of those restrictions, see Jill E. Family, Stripping Judicial Review 
During Immigration Reform: The Certificate of Reviewability, 8 NEV. L.J. 499, 502–03 (2008). 
 33. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2006). 
 34. The statute authorizes immigration inspectors to order expedited removal when they 
determine that arriving noncitizens at ports of entry are inadmissible because of either fraud or 
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determinations, and most cases in which the noncitizens are 
removable on crime-related grounds.35 The bar on review of most 
discretionary decisions has had a particularly substantial impact 
because, as the Justice Department has pointed out, “the dominant 
number of the Board’s cases relate to . . . relief from removal.”36 The 
collective consequence of these various bars on judicial review has 
been that asylum cases (which are still reviewable)37 now make up the 
bulk of the courts’ immigration caseloads.38 Service of the petition for 
review does not automatically stay removal pending the court’s 
decision, but upon motion by the noncitizen the court has the 
discretion to grant a stay.39 
II.  THE PROBLEMS 
The United States immigration adjudication system is beset with 
crippling problems. Immigration judges occupy positions of 
unhealthy dependence within the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service[,] . . . lack adequate support services, and frequently face 
debilitating conflicts with agency personnel. Board of Immigration 
Appeals members perform appellate functions without job security 
or statutory recognition. Long delays pervade the quasi-judicial 
hearing and appellate process. The availability of further review in 
federal courts postpones finality, encourages litigation, and 
undermines the authority of initial appellate determinations.40 
 
insufficient entry documents. In those cases the statute dispenses with several of the procedural 
ingredients otherwise required in removal proceedings, and the process is designed to be fast. 
Id. § 1225(b)(1). 
 35. Id. § 1252(a)(2). 
 36. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 
Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,880 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003); see also 
EOIR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: EOIR AT A GLANCE 2 (2009), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/eoir/press/09/EOIRataGlance121409.pdf (“In most removal proceedings, 
individuals admit that they are removable, but then apply for one or more forms of relief.”). 
 37. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (exempting relief under § 1158(a)—that is, asylum—
from the bar on judicial review of discretionary decisions). 
 38. Benson, supra note 7, at 425, 428; John R.B. Palmer, The Second Circuit’s “New 
Asylum Seekers”: Responses to an Expanded Immigration Docket, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 965, 966 
(2006). 
 39. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B). 
 40. Levinson, supra note 7, at 644 (footnotes omitted). 
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A. The Manifestations 
Those words were written in 1981 by former congressional 
counsel Peter Levinson. As this Section will demonstrate, the 
problems have only grown. They have manifested themselves in 
dubious and inconsistent outcomes; a lack of confidence in the results 
felt by parties, reviewing courts, and commentators; an extraordinary 
surge of requests for judicial review of the final administrative 
decisions; substantial duplication of effort; and lengthy delays. 
The generic goals of adjudication are a logical starting point for 
gauging the effectiveness of the immigration adjudication system. 
Roger Cramton has posited,41 and others have refined,42 three such 
goals—accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability. I have suggested a 
fourth goal—consistency—that overlaps substantially but not 
completely with the other three.43 Measured against those goals, how 
does the immigration adjudication system fare? 
At a minimum, accuracy encompasses ultimate results that the 
evidence and the relevant law reasonably support. Admittedly, 
accuracy is hard to assess objectively. Errors are difficult to identify 
when, as is true in removal cases, decisions frequently require 
subjective judgments. Still, the unprecedented scathing criticisms that 
so many U.S. courts of appeals have leveled at EOIR are 
disconcerting.44 Lending both credibility and relevance to these 
condemnations are two striking realities. First, the attacks come from 
many different judges with diverse political leanings. Second, the 
criticisms extend beyond the particular decisions under review to 
broad-based, systemic complaints about patterns of sloppy, poorly 
reasoned decisions that the courts of appeals encounter day after day. 
These cases are likely only the tip of the iceberg, because they 
include only those that reach the courts of appeals. The vast majority 
of removal orders never get to that point,45 sometimes because the 
individual has no convincing ground for appeal, but on other 
 
 41. Roger C. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform: The Effects of S. 1663 on the 
Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings, 16 ADMIN. L. REV. 108, 111–12 (1964). 
 42. David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative 
Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1975). 
 43. Legomsky, supra note 6, at 1313–14. 
 44. See infra note 68. 
 45. See EOIR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: BIA RESTRUCTURING AND 
STREAMLINING PROCEDURES 2 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/06/BIA 
StreamliningFactSheet030906.pdf (noting that approximately 30 percent of the BIA’s final 
orders are appealed to federal court). 
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occasions because the statute bars judicial review, the person lacks 
the resources to go to court, or the person has no access to counsel 
and never discovers the right to appeal. In all those instances, any 
errors that the courts might have corrected in appealed cases go 
unnoticed. 
Efficiency comprises both using fiscal resources wisely and 
minimizing elapsed time. As for the efficient use of resources, the 
picture is mixed. On the one hand, the tight budgetary constraints on 
EOIR have forced both immigration judges and the BIA to decide 
massive numbers of cases.46 Moreover, the procedural shortcuts that 
these caseloads prompt adjudicators to adopt have enabled them to 
decide cases very quickly. In those senses, efficiency might be 
perceived as high. 
On the other hand, BIA reforms instituted in 2002 have triggered 
a flood of petitions for review in the courts of appeals. As a result, the 
courts have had to duplicate much of the BIA’s appellate review—a 
highly inefficient result. In fiscal year 2008, the BIA handed down 
34,812 appeals from decisions of immigration judges.47 In that same 
year, the courts of appeals received 10,280 petitions for review of BIA 
decisions48—an approximate appeal rate of 30 percent.49 Those 
petitions for review comprised 17 percent of the combined caseloads 
of the courts of appeals50 and have created a now well-documented 
crisis for the federal courts.51 The problem is not merely the 
 
 46. The data are summarized in Part II.B.1, infra. 
 47. EOIR, supra note 5, at S2 fig.27. 
 48. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR app. at 96 tbl.B-3 (2009), available at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/appendices/B03Sep08.pdf. 
 49. The 30 percent figure is simply 10,280 divided by 34,812. The 10,280 court of appeals 
filings in fiscal year 2008 presumably include petitions for review of some 2007 BIA decisions, 
and conversely exclude 2009 petitions for review of 2008 BIA decisions. Thus, the two sets of 
cases are not 100 percent congruent, and the 30 percent figure is therefore only an estimate. It is 
most likely a very close estimate, however, because the petition for review must be filed within 
30 days of the BIA decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (2006). 
 50. In fiscal year 2008 the courts of appeals received 61,104 appeals. ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 48, app. at 96 tbl.B-3. 
 51. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 7, at 12–13; Alexander, supra note 7, at 2; 
Benson, supra note 7, at 410–15; Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate Caseload and Its 
Processing, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 287, 287–88 (2006); John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of 
the Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 13, 14, 20 (2006/07); John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, 
Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal 
Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
1, 3 (2005). The Circuit Executive of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit described 
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overtaxing of the judges; caseload pressures have required massive 
increases in the legal staffs, the clerks’ offices, and the circuit 
executives’ offices,52 as well as government prosecutorial resources.53 
The Second and Ninth Circuits have been hit the hardest. In fiscal 
year 2008, immigration cases comprised 41 percent of the entire 
Second Circuit docket and 34 percent of the Ninth Circuit docket.54 
To cope with its bloated docket, the Second Circuit has had to 
institute a no-oral-argument system for asylum cases.55 
Adding to the inefficiency are the high remand rates reported by 
at least two circuits. The Second Circuit has been remanding 
approximately 20 percent of its petitions for review of BIA decisions, 
and the Seventh Circuit 40 percent.56 (The national remand rate is 
murkier but almost certainly lower, a point taken up below.)57 When 
the remand rates are that high, the inefficiency of a second round of 
appellate review is compounded by the need for the BIA to review 
cases a second time (and for the courts of appeals to review cases a 
second time when the immigrants petition for review of the second 
BIA decision). 
Perhaps most important, “efficient” does not mean “cheap.” The 
ideal adjudication system would churn out a high number of accurate 
decisions at a low cost. In algebraic terms, adjudicatory efficiency 
might therefore be thought of as productivity times accuracy, divided 
by cost.58 
 
the court’s caseload problem succinctly: “two words: ‘immigration cases.’” Catterson, supra, at 
294. 
 52. Catterson, supra note 51, at 293 tbl.4. 
 53. See infra notes 271–75 and accompanying text. 
 54. In that year, 2,865 of the 6,904 cases filed in the Second Circuit were petitions for 
review of BIA decisions, as were 4,625 of the 13,577 cases filed in the Ninth Circuit. ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 48, app. at 97 tbl.B-3, 100 tbl.B-3. 
 55. See Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 5, 7 (2006) (testimony of John M. Walker, Jr., C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/109hrg/28339.pdf 
(discussing the Second Circuit’s “Non-Argument Calendar”). 
 56. Id. at 188 (statement of John M. Walker, Jr.); see also Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 
828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (“In the year ending on the date of the argument, different panels of this 
court reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals in whole or part in a staggering 40 percent of 
the 136 petitions to review the Board that were resolved on the merits.”). 
 57. See infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text. 
 58. This formula is meant only to capture what I see as the basic relationship among 
accuracy, productivity, cost, and efficiency. It is subject to important caveats. Accuracy, as just 
noted, is difficult to measure because the subjective nature of many decisions often leaves 
adjudicators with more than one “correct” answer. Also, even if every decision could be labeled 
definitively as right or wrong, my formula is agnostic with respect to the values to be placed on 
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Finally, efficiency also embraces elapsed time. As of April 30, 
2009, there were 201,000 cases pending before the immigration 
judges, a 19 percent increase in three years.59 The average age of the 
pending cases, again as of the end of fiscal year 2008, was 14.5 
months, an increase of 23 percent over the same period.60 I could not 
find analogous data for the BIA or for the courts of appeals, but 
whatever the average elapsed times are for these adjudicatory bodies, 
having two rounds of appellate review rather than one adds further 
delay. Again, when so many cases are remanded to the BIA (and 
some of those decisions on remand appealed once again to the courts 
of appeals), the delays are exacerbated. 
Delay is particularly inefficient in the removal context. 
Individuals are routinely detained while they wait, at a great cost to 
both personal liberty and the public fisc.61 Those who are not detained 
have additional incentives to delay their removals by filing appeals, 
and some people believe these incentives have spawned large 
numbers of frivolous appeals.62 Moreover, immigrants are subject to 
forcible removal from the United States while awaiting the outcomes 
of their petitions for review, unless the court affirmatively directs 
otherwise.63 
 
accuracy and productivity. If accuracy were quantified as the ratio of correct decisions to total 
decisions, for example, this formula would produce some counterinstinctive results. A system 
that decides one hundred cases but gets only half of them right would earn the same efficiency 
rating as a system that, at the same cost, decides only fifty cases but gets all of them right. Yet 
most would regard the latter system as far more efficient. As that result suggests, the relative 
values that one assigns to one unit of accuracy and one unit of productivity, respectively, will 
influence one’s assessment of efficiency. 
 59. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Number of Immigration Judges, 1998–
2008 on Payroll at End of Fiscal Year, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/208/include/ 
backlog.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules, and Discretion, 30 
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 531, 542 (1999); Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A 
“White Paper,” 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 680 (1997); Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens 
Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 
22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1099–102 (1995). See generally MARK DOW, AMERICAN 
GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS (2004) (studying detainee treatment in American 
immigration prisons). 
 62. Judge Carlos Bea of the Ninth Circuit, for example, believes that the flood of petitions 
for review in the courts of appeals has caused backlogs that have themselves encouraged many 
people to file frivolous petitions for review solely to delay their removal. Family, supra note 32, 
at 521. 
 63. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (2006). 
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The acceptability goal reflects the familiar maxim that justice 
must not only be done, but be seen. Viewed in that light, acceptability 
has two components, one concerning the parties to the case and the 
other concerning the general public. An ideal justice system assures 
the parties that justice was carried out both substantively and 
procedurally. The frustrations of the parties to removal hearings are 
reflected in the extremely high rates of appeal from the BIA to the 
courts. As noted above, the courts of appeals received petitions for 
review in approximately 30 percent of the BIA decisions rendered in 
fiscal year 2008. As high as that percentage is, it understates the level 
of dissatisfaction with the BIA decisions because, for a number of 
reasons, only a fraction of the BIA decisions are appealable. First, 
only the immigrant, not the government, may file a petition for 
review.64 Second, because the principal question in most removal 
proceedings is whether the immigrant should receive some form of 
discretionary relief,65 and because Congress has barred the courts of 
appeals from reviewing most denials of discretionary relief,66 many 
BIA decisions cannot be appealed even when the immigrants are the 
aggrieved parties. This combination means that the percentage of 
reviewable BIA decisions in which the immigrant seeks review is 
much higher than the already substantial 30 percent figure. Finally, 
even when the immigrant has lost before the BIA and the decision is 
reviewable, the immigrant who lacks counsel,67 the resources to 
appeal, or simply knowledge that review is possible might well fail to 
file a petition. For all these reasons, the high rate at which immigrants 
seek review of BIA decisions should raise a red flag. 
If there were reason to assume immigrants file petitions for 
review primarily to delay their removals, the high rates of these 
petitions would offer little probative evidence of the lack of 
confidence in BIA decisions. But because a petition for review no 
 
 64. The statute does not say this expressly, but under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), judicial review 
“is governed only by chapter 158 of title 28.” That title, in turn, contains 28 U.S.C. § 2344, which 
prescribes petitions for review in the courts of appeals as the procedure for challenging various 
administrative agency decisions and adds “[t]he action shall be against the United States.” 
Because the United States presumably cannot bring an action against itself, the latter sentence 
implies that only the party aggrieved by government action may petition for review. In practice, 
the government has no need to ask a court to reverse a BIA decision because the attorney 
general can simply do so unilaterally. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (2009). 
 65. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 66. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). 
 67. In fiscal year 2008, 78 percent of the immigrants who appealed to the BIA had legal 
representation. EOIR, supra note 5, at W1 fig.30. 
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longer stays removal (unless the court, after preliminarily reviewing 
the merits of the case, orders otherwise), there is little reason to 
assume delay is the dominant motive. 
The other component of acceptability is public confidence in the 
integrity and efficiency of the process. Though there is no evidence 
that the general public has any particular view of the immigration 
adjudication procedures, scathing criticisms are now commonplace 
among experts. The succession of stern rebukes from courts of 
appeals—often directed at systemic patterns rather than confined to 
the cases before them—have been well publicized.68 Scholarly studies 
and commentary consistently offer similarly harsh critiques.69 The 
2002 BIA reforms have only heightened that dissatisfaction.70 
Consistency, like the other adjudication goals, is a matter of 
degree. Ideally, both a single adjudicator’s internal body of work and 
the decisions of the adjudicators collectively should produce similar 
results on similar facts. Viewed in that light, consistency is bound up 
with the other adjudication goals. Inconsistent results can evidence 
inaccurate outcomes, diminish public confidence in the system, and 
generate inefficiencies such as additional appeals. Inconsistency is 
also independently problematic because it undermines the equal 
justice principle that similarly situated parties should receive similar 
treatment. 
On this score, too, serious problems are evident. At least three 
recent major studies have exposed eye-popping differences in the 
approval rates from one asylum adjudicator to another.71 One set of 
 
 68. For lists of court decisions containing some of the more pointed language (as well as 
court decisions that in turn cite lists of similar court decisions), see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & 
CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 747–48 (5th ed. 
2009); Benedetto, supra note 7, at 492–93. 
 69. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 7, at 21, 25. In addition to direct criticisms of the 
process, see supra note 7, the ABA Commission report notes “public skepticism” about the 
immigration court process and, given the attorney general’s control over the procedures, 
perceptions that the system as a whole is unfair. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 28, 
44. 
 70. See supra note 7. 
 71. See TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, ASYLUM DISPARITIES 
PERSIST, REGARDLESS OF COURT LOCATION AND NATIONALITY (2007), http://trac.syr.edu/ 
immigration/reports/183/; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-08-940, U.S. 
ASYLUM SYSTEM: SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS 
IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08940. 
pdf; see also Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 296 (“[I]n one regional asylum office . . . some 
officers grant[ed] asylum to no Chinese nationals, while other officers granted asylum in as 
many as 68% of their cases. Similarly, Colombian asylum applicants whose cases were 
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adjudicators, the asylum officers employed by USCIS, are beyond the 
scope of this Article. Among the immigration judges, however, the 
authors observed the same spectacular disparities, even after 
controlling for different office locations and for the claimants’ varying 
countries of origin. All three studies were confined to asylum cases, 
which possess distinctive attributes, but there is no apparent 
distinction between asylum cases and nonasylum removal cases that 
would systematically generate any greater consistency within the 
latter group. 
B. The Causes 
Measured by accuracy, efficiency, acceptability, and consistency, 
therefore, the current immigration adjudication system is 
fundamentally flawed. The next challenge is to locate the sources of 
these problems. The four prime suspects are (1) the extreme 
underresourcing of EOIR, with exceptionally high ratios of caseloads 
to adjudicators, support staff, and prosecutors; (2) procedural 
shortcuts such as making single-member decisions the norm and 
resorting heavily to either affirmances without opinion or other 
cursory opinions; (3) politicization of EOIR through a combination of 
partisan and ideological hiring practices (now largely corrected), 
continuing threats to adjudicators’ job security, subjection of 
adjudicators’ decisions to a political official with law enforcement 
responsibilities, and the general supervision of adjudicators and 
control of their resources by enforcement officials; and (4) a small but 
significant number of adjudicators who are not well suited to the job. 
One complication is that some of these causes are in turn the results 
of other causes. 
1. Suspect # 1: The Underresourcing of EOIR.  Massive caseloads 
have strained the capacities of adjudicators, their support staffs, and 
government prosecutors. In fiscal year 2008, immigration judges 
completed 278,939 removal proceedings, another 2,102 miscellaneous 
proceedings, 13,294 motions to reopen and other motions, and 44,736 
bond redetermination hearings.72 Approximately 214 immigration 
 
adjudicated in the federal immigration court in Miami had a 5% chance of prevailing with one 
of that court’s judges and an 88% chance of prevailing before another judge in the same 
building.”). 
 72. EOIR, supra note 5, at C4 tbl.4, B7 fig.3. The figure shown above for removal 
proceedings includes small numbers of exclusion and deportation proceedings—the now 
superseded names for what are today called removal proceedings. Id. at C4 tbl.4. 
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judges performed this work.73 Taking a range of factors into account, 
one study estimated that over the course of fiscal year 2008, the 
average immigration judge completed 4.3 removal cases each day. On 
that assumption, the same study calculated that reducing each 
immigration judge’s caseload by just one case per day would require 
seventy-six additional immigration judges; to reduce the load by two 
cases per day would require 204 new immigration judges.74 Another 
study estimated that the average immigration judge had available 
only seventy-three minutes per matter (not just removal proceedings) 
received.75 
Those caseloads would strain the capacities of adjudicators under 
almost any circumstances, but the news gets worse. The support staffs 
of the immigration judges are exceptionally thin, a longstanding 
problem76 that has worsened with today’s much larger caseloads. As 
of August 20, 2009, the 232 immigration judges shared only fifty-six 
law clerks77—approximately one for every four immigration judges.78 
There are no bailiffs; immigration judges must therefore take time for 
administrative chores such as arranging the recording of the hearings 
 
 73. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Number of Immigration Judges, 1998–
2009, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/208/include/payroll.html (last visited Mar. 30, 
2010). The TRAC figure counts only those immigration judges who decide cases, not others who 
hold the title “immigration judge” but perform purely administrative functions. See id. As of 
August 20, 2009, there were 232 immigration judges (including those in administrative 
positions), plus twenty-one vacancies and a fiscal year 2010 budget request for twenty-eight new 
immigration judge positions. Elaine Komis, Pub. Affairs Officer, EOIR, EOIR’s Immigration 
Court and Board of Immigration Appeals: Staffing, Budget, and Case Adjudications 1 (Sept. 9, 
2009) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 74. APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 10. Others have estimated the average caseload at four 
per day, COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 28, five per day, Immigration Litigation 
Reduction, supra note 55, at 6, and even six per day, Alexander, supra note 7, at 19. 
 75. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Maximum Average Minutes Available 
Per Matter Received, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/208/include/minutes.html (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2010). 
 76. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 16 (arguing that “[i]n considering any alternatives to the 
present system,” “[a]dequate support” is necessary); Leon Wildes, The Need for a Specialized 
Immigration Court: A Practical Response, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 53, 55, 63 (1980) (reviewing 
Roberts’s reform proposal and concurring with the need for increased funding and staffing to 
clear “the backlog of unadjudicated applications”). 
 77. Komis, supra note 73, at 1. 
 78. See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Number of Judicial Law Clerks, 
2006–2009, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/208/include/lawclerks.html (last visited Mar. 
30, 2010). For similar calculations, see APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 11; COMM’N ON 
IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 28; ABA, Resolution 114B Adopted by the House of Delegates 
2 (Feb. 8–9, 2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2010/midyear/daily_jourmal/ 
114B.pdf. 
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and keeping track of documents.79 Many immigrants are 
unrepresented in removal hearings, so the immigration judge must 
take time to advise the immigrants of possible relief provisions, 
explain the procedures, and answer questions.80 Moreover, 78 percent 
of individuals in removal hearings require language interpreters.81 In 
addition to interpreted testimony inherently consuming twice the 
usual time because of the need to repeat it in a second language, 
immigration judges must often labor to assure the accuracy of the 
translations.82 
For all these reasons, a parade of judges, commentators, and 
organizations have lamented the extreme underresourcing of the 
immigration courts.83 Chief Judge Walker of the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
urged a doubling of the immigration judge corps.84 He added: 
I fail to see how Immigration Judges can be expected to make 
thorough and competent findings of fact and conclusions of law 
under these circumstances. This is especially true given the unique 
nature of immigration hearings. Aliens frequently do not speak 
English, so the Immigration Judge must work with a translator, and 
the Immigration Judge normally must go over particular testimony 
several times before he can be confident that he is getting an 
accurate answer from the alien. Hearings, particularly in asylum 
cases, are highly fact intensive and depend upon the presentation 
and consideration of numerous details and documents to determine 
issues of credibility and to reach factual conclusions. This can take 
 
 79. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, CASE BACKLOGS IN 
IMMIGRATION COURTS EXPAND, RESULTING WAIT TIMES GROW (2009), http://trac.syr.edu/ 
immigration/reports/208/. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 383. 
 83. See Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 55, at 5–7; APPLESEED, supra note 7, 
at 10; Alexander, supra note 7, at 19–20; Benedetto, supra note 7, at 500; Marks, supra note 7, at 
8, 13 (calling the case completion expectations unrealistic with present resources); Ramji-
Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 383; TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, 
supra note 79; cf. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 19–21 (tracing excessive EOIR 
caseloads to insufficient funding, but also faulting DHS reluctance to use prosecutorial 
discretion in cases where transgressions were minor or chances of removal were slim). 
 84. Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 55, at 6; see also ABA, supra note 78, at 2 
(recommending one hundred additional immigration judges and at least one law clerk per 
judge); COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 28 (same). 
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no small amount of time depending on the nature of the alien’s 
testimony.85 
The situation is no rosier at the BIA. In fiscal year 2008, fifteen 
BIA members decided more than 38,000 cases86—an average of more 
than 2,500 appeals per member per year (more than fifty per week). 
As with the immigration judges, the overwhelming BIA caseload has 
come under strong criticism.87 
The adjudicators, however, are not the only government 
personnel who lack the resources to give these cases the attention 
they deserve. The government prosecutors are feeling the strain as 
well. ICE’s Principal Legal Advisor reports: 
Across the country our Assistant Chief Counsels [the ICE attorneys 
who represent the government in immigration judge and BIA 
proceedings] universally and passionately opine that they do not 
have nearly enough time to properly prepare for immigration 
proceedings, let alone to advise our clients or to work on appeals 
before the BIA. Indeed, the universal feeling is that they are 
woefully unprepared for immigration hearings due to the extremely 
large amount of individual cases they are required to cover before 
the immigration judges.88 
What have been the practical effects of this steadily more 
extreme underresourcing? I believe it has generated an intricate 
network of adverse causes and consequences that might be 
summarized as follows: 
First, at least at the immigration judge level, underresourcing has 
contributed simultaneously to less judge time per case and longer 
elapsed time from filing to disposition (and therefore to steadily 
growing backlogs). The data confirm both results. A recent study by 
 
 85. Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 55, at 186–87. 
 86. EOIR, supra note 5, at S2 fig.27. 
 87. See, e.g., Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 55, at 6 (urging that the number 
of BIA members be doubled); APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 34; Alexander, supra note 7, at 20–
21; Benson, supra note 7, at 418. The ABA has recommended hiring forty additional BIA staff 
attorneys. ABA, Resolution 114C Adopted by the House of Delegates 4 (Feb. 8–9, 2010), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2010/midyear/daily_jourmal/114C.pdf; COMM’N 
ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 34. 
 88. E-mail from Peter Vincent, supra note 10. The previous principal legal advisor had 
echoed similar sentiments, adding that on average the ICE trial attorneys (as they were then 
called) had only twenty minutes to prepare each case. APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 16 (citing 
ICE Principal Legal Advisor William J. Howard and calling for the hiring of additional trial 
attorneys). 
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Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) reveals that, 
from 1998 to 2008, the number of immigration judges increased by 
only 6 percent (from 202 to 214),89 while the total number of matters 
received increased by 24 percent (from 282,348 to 351,477).90 At the 
same time that this increase in the caseloads was significantly 
outpacing the increase in the number of immigration judges, two 
other patterns emerged. Naturally, the average time available per 
matter received diminished (from an already low eighty-six minutes 
to seventy-three minutes).91 Even with immigration judges spending 
less time per case, the backlog increased from 129,482 pending cases 
to 186,342 cases.92 The average time that cases were pending increased 
correspondingly, from 10.8 months to 14.5 months.93 From these data, 
it appears that immigration judges responded to the increasingly 
severe underresourcing both by reducing time spent per case and by 
increasing elapsed time from filings to final dispositions—that is, 
longer delays. 
In addition to rushed decisions and increased delays, 
underresourcing has contributed to the now well-documented 
burnout of immigration judges. A recent empirical study has 
confirmed the exceptionally high stress and burnout levels of 
immigration judges—levels even higher than those experienced by 
prison wardens and emergency room physicians.94 The authors 
identified several root causes of the burnout, but by far the most 
commonly reported problems related to the lack of sufficient time 
and resources to meet the case completion expectations.95 More 
specifically, the immigration judges complained of too little time per 
case; the pressure to provide immediate, detailed, oral decisions, even 
in complex cases, with no time to research the law or country 
conditions, no time to reflect, and no transcripts; unprepared lawyers 
(on both sides); difficulties with interpreters; insufficient staffing, 
 
 89. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 73. 
 90. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 75. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 59. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the 
National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
57, 59–60 (2008) (summarizing the results of a web-based survey of immigration judges). 
 95. Id. at 64–70. 
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including very few law clerks; faulty and outdated computers and 
recording devices; and inadequate work space.96 
Finally, the underresourcing and resulting BIA backlogs drove 
the Justice Department’s BIA procedural reforms in 2002.97 The 
centerpiece of those reforms was the elimination of various 
procedural safeguards. The effects exacerbated some of the problems 
associated with the underresourcing, as the next Section explains. 
In turn, these consequences of underresourcing—the reduced 
time per case, increased backlogs, and immigration judge burnout—
have all had additional adverse effects. As Chief Judge Walker of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has testified, 
“the principal reason . . . for the current backlog in the Courts of 
Appeals, and the reason that we have higher expected numbers of 
cases being remanded are a severe lack of resources and manpower at 
the immigration judge and BIA levels in the Department of Justice.”98 
Chief Judge Walker’s conclusion is not surprising. When adjudicators 
are pressured to decide so many cases involving complex facts and 
often complex law every day, particularly with the limited resources 
just described, the result will inevitably be conveyor-belt justice, no 
matter how talented and how diligent the personnel. Immigration 
adjudication might not be uniquely underresourced, but in this field 
the problem is extreme, and both the individual and the public 
interests are large. 
The causal links, therefore, are intricate. Rushed decisions 
contribute to burnout. Rushed decisions and burnout together 
inevitably compromise accuracy and consistency, a harm in and of 
itself. Reduced accuracy and consistency in turn lead to more 
petitions for review, which then compound the delays that the 
underresourcing has already caused at the administrative level. For 
those who believe that delays spur frivolous appeals from immigrants 
desirous only of prolonging their stays in the United States, the 
 
 96. Id. Other sources of the burnout and stress include lack of respect from the courts, the 
Department of Justice, and the public; post-traumatic stress from hearing a steady diet of 
wrenching asylum cases; and perceptions of fraud in the presentation of cases. Id. at 71–77. 
 97. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case 
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,878–79 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. 
pt. 1003) (presenting as background the problems in the adjudicatory process of immigration 
appeals); John D. Ashcroft & Kris W. Kobach, A More Perfect System: The 2002 Reforms of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals, 58 DUKE L.J. 1991, 1991–92, 1994 (2009) (discussing the massive 
backlog of immigration cases and its negative effects, as well as the regulatory goal of gradually 
eliminating that backlog). 
 98. Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 55, at 5. 
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effects are cyclical; the additional appeals cause further backlogs, 
which further increase the delays, which further enhance the incentive 
to file frivolous appeals, and so on. All of these consequences, in turn, 
feed the frustrations of the parties, the courts, and the general public, 
impairing the acceptability goal of the adjudication process. And the 
diminished acceptability prompts increasingly sharp and increasingly 
numerous criticisms that in turn aggravate the adjudicator burnout to 
which some of the inaccuracies and inconsistencies can be attributed 
in the first place. 
But there is more: 
2. Suspect # 2: The Procedural Shortcuts at the BIA.  Of the 
various BIA procedural reforms introduced by Attorney General 
Ashcroft in 2002, two have generated the lion’s share of the 
controversy. One initiative concerns the so-called “affirmances 
without opinion” (AWOs). These are cases in which the BIA is 
prohibited from giving reasons for its decisions.99 The 2002 reforms 
made AWOs the norm rather than the exception.100 After the 
resulting dramatic spike in the percentages of decisions culminating in 
AWOs, formal AWOs have now dwindled to approximately 5 percent 
of the BIA decisions.101 That decline is of small consolation, however, 
because “short opinions by single members are now the dominant 
form of decision making. . . . [T]hey can be as short as two or three 
sentences, even when the issues would appear to merit a longer 
discussion.’’102 The other controversial structural change was moving 
from three-member panel review in the vast majority of cases to 
single-member review in the vast majority103 (at this writing, 94 
percent)104 of all BIA cases. Both elements have real costs in terms of 
 
 99. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2009). A still-pending proposed rule would make AWOs 
discretionary rather than mandatory. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without 
Opinion, Referral for Panel Review, and Publication of Decisions as Precedents, 73 Fed. Reg. 
34,654, 34,663 (proposed June 18, 2008) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1). 
 100. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case 
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,880 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. pt. 
1003) (“The final rule establishes the primacy of the streamlining system for the majority of 
cases.”). 
 101. See infra notes 119–20 and accompanying text. 
 102. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 32. 
 103. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case 
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. at 54,879 (asserting the rule’s expansion of single-member review to 
“the dominant method of adjudication for the large majority of cases before the Board”). 
 104. Komis, supra note 73, app. question 17. From fiscal years 2003 through 2008, this 
percentage remained between 93 percent and 94 percent. Id. 
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accuracy, acceptability, consistency, and even efficiency, given the 
resulting diversion of BIA cases to the courts. 
There is ample reason to believe the 2002 BIA procedural 
reforms have greatly exacerbated the problems discussed in Section 
A. The most compelling evidence of a causal link is the absence of 
any other plausible explanation for the coincidence in timing. The 
reforms officially took effect on September 25, 2002.105 The avalanche 
of petitions for review of BIA decisions began suddenly after that, as 
Table 1 demonstrates. 
 
Table 1.  Petitions for Review of BIA Decisions Filed During Twelve-
Month Periods Ending March 31106 
 
Twelve-Month Periods Ending  
March 31 of Year 












To the extent the surge in petitions for review is both 
problematic in and of itself and evidence of deeper problems in the 
tribunals whose decisions are being challenged, Table 1 compels at 
least a presumption that the 2002 BIA procedural reforms are, and 
remain, a principal cause of those problems. The number of petitions 
 
 105. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 
Fed. Reg. at 54,878 (specifying effective date of Sept. 25, 2002). Some of the reforms, however, 
were implemented in stages in the preceding few months. See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales et al., supra 
note 7, at 351–52 (describing the March 2002 expansion of affirmances without opinion); cf. 
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 7, at 24–25 (discussing the time limits added in the 
modified case management procedures). 
 106. These data are extracted from a chart provided by Cathy Catterson, Circuit Executive, 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (June 9, 2009) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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for review in the years ending March 31, 2001 and 2002 were virtually 
identical—1,763 and 1,764, respectively. During the next twelve-
month period, the first year in which the BIA procedural reforms 
were in effect, filings almost quintupled. Filings peaked three years 
later at 13,059. They have since declined but still remain at more than 
five times the pre-BIA reform levels. 
Are there alternative explanations for this sudden surge? 
Changes in total BIA decisions cannot explain this phenomenon. The 
BIA’s output has fluctuated over the years, but in each of the three 
most recent years (ending March 31, 2009), total BIA decisions have 
been almost exactly the same as in the year ending March 31, 2002, 
the last year before the BIA reforms went into effect.107 Most telling 
have been the dramatic changes in the rates at which immigrants have 
petitioned for review of BIA decisions. In the twelve-month period 
ending March 31, 2002 (the last twelve-month period before the 
reforms), immigrants petitioned for review of only 5 percent of all 
BIA decisions. That rate more than tripled—to 16 percent—the very 
next year and continued to rise steadily after that, peaking at 32 
percent in the year ending March 31, 2006.108 
The number of BIA decisions adverse to immigrants is a truer 
measure of rates of petitions for review than total BIA decisions, 
because only immigrants—not the government—may file petitions for 
review.109 Indeed, several studies show that the BIA procedural 
reforms led immediately to a significant drop in the percentage of 
BIA decisions favorable to immigrants.110 Still, although the estimates 
of the changes in BIA outcomes vary, none of them approaches the 
order of magnitude of the percentage surge in petitions for review.111 
Moreover, to the extent that the increase in progovernment BIA 
decisions contributed to the surge in petitions for review, the question 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 110. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 7, app. 24; Alexander, supra note 7, at 12; 
Palmer et al., supra note 51, at 94; Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 358–59. 
 111. By way of illustration, one estimate is that the percentage of BIA decisions in favor of 
immigrants suddenly dropped from 25 percent to 10 percent following the procedural reforms. 
Alexander, supra note 7, at 12. If those figures are correct, then the percentage of BIA decisions 
in favor of the government increased from 75 percent to 90 percent. Even that substantial 
difference, however, would increase the pool of judicially reviewable cases by only 15 of 75, or 
20 percent (all else equal)—not nearly enough to explain the quintupling in petitions for review. 
See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 360–61 (documenting similarly sharp drops in BIA 
asylum approval rates). 
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arises: What caused the increase in progovernment BIA decisions? 
Because that large and sudden change coincided with the BIA 
procedural reforms (as well as the personnel purge discussed in 
Section II.B.3), the latter would seem, in the absence of other 
explanations, to be the most compelling explanation. The conclusion 
seems irrefutable: the more time and attention the BIA was able to 
give to a case, whether by assigning the case to a three-member panel, 
providing a reasoned opinion, or both, the more likely the immigrant 
was to prevail. The moment these procedural safeguards were 
eliminated, immigrants began losing at greater rates. The correlation 
is troubling. 
The Justice Department does not dispute the link between the 
2002 BIA procedural reforms and the surge in petitions for review. 
Rather, it maintains that the surge simply does not evidence any 
decrease in the accuracy of the BIA decisions.112 It argues that a truer 
test of the quality of the BIA decisions is the rate at which the courts 
of appeals have remanded decisions once petitions for review are 
filed, and it asserts that those remand rates have not changed 
significantly since the implementation of the 2002 BIA procedural 
reforms.113 For the latter proposition, the Department refers vaguely 
to “feedback” from federal courts and the Department’s Office of 
Immigration Litigation (OIL), the unit that argues the government’s 
side in petitions for review. The Department did not provide citations 
or specific numbers to support this claim. In fact, the data on the rates 
at which the courts of appeals have remanded BIA decisions (and on 
the changes in those rates) are murky. As noted in Section A,114 the 
remand rates are exceptionally high in the Second and Seventh 
Circuits, but estimates of the national rates are mixed.115 
Moreover, if anything, one would expect a constant accuracy 
level at the BIA to result in decreasing remand rates by the courts of 
appeals, for three reasons. First, the relevant period (2002 through 
early 2009) was one in which all federal judicial appointments were 
those of President George W. Bush. A more conservative judiciary 
would have been expected to display greater deference to the BIA 
and less sympathy for the immigrants who were filing petitions for 
 
 112. See EOIR, supra note 45, at 2. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 115. See, e.g., APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 32; COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 
33; Alexander, supra note 7, at 14; Ashcroft & Kobach, supra note 97, at 2009. 
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review. Second, the Justice Department believes that the new flood of 
petitions for review are largely frivolous, motivated principally by a 
desire to delay removal. If the Department is right, however, one 
would expect a sharp drop in the success rate for these new petitions 
for review—not merely the absence of significant change. Third, as 
the courts of appeals remand more and more cases with explanations 
and instructions, the BIA acquires more information and should be 
better able to identify patterns that permit it to head off potential 
court of appeals remands. 
If not a drop in accuracy of BIA decisions (or at least a lessened 
confidence in those decisions), then what might explain the surge 
occurring immediately following the implementation of the 2002 BIA 
procedural reforms? The Justice Department offered the following 
theories: 
[I]t is reasonable to conclude that the initial increase may have been 
largely attributable to challenges to the new regulation. However, 
new petitions for review have continued to increase despite the 
federal courts’ uniform rejection of these challenges. It is possible 
that eliminating BIA adjudication delays has increased the incentive 
to file petitions for review in the federal courts in order to postpone 
deportation and remain in the United States for as long as 
possible.116 
The Department thus acknowledges that the initial challenges to 
the validity of the 2002 BIA reforms do not explain the continuation 
of the surge long after those challenges had been uniformly rejected. 
At any rate, the Department makes no showing that petitions raising 
those challenges (and only those challenges) comprised a significant 
percentage of those early petitions for review. Its only remaining 
hypothesis, therefore, is that the reforms shortened the elapsed time 
for BIA appeals and that, as a result, those immigrants who are 
motivated solely by a desire to delay their ultimate deportations must 
now resort to filing frivolous petitions for review. This hypothesis, 
too, seems implausible. First, stays pending judicial review are no 
longer automatic; petitioners for review must persuade the reviewing 
courts that their petitions have enough merit to justify stays.117 Second 
and more importantly, the essential premise of the Department’s 
 
 116. EOIR, supra note 45, at 3. 
 117. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (2006); see also Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1763 (2009) 
(prescribing a multifactor test, which includes the likelihood of success on the merits, for 
determining whether to stay removal pending final court decision). 
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speculation is that attaining one period of delay diminishes one’s 
incentive for further delay. There is no basis for that assumption. To 
the contrary, if anything, one would expect the person who has 
already spent a lengthy period in the United States (as was true when 
BIA appeals were taking longer) to have deeper roots and 
consequently a greater incentive, not a lesser one, to seek additional 
delay. 
Moreover, there were logical reasons to expect the procedural 
shortcuts implemented in 2002 to have precisely the adverse effects 
that occurred. The AWOs are particularly suspect. In any case in 
which a single BIA member determines that the immigration judge 
reached the correct result, that any errors were harmless, and that the 
issues are either “squarely controlled” by precedent or otherwise too 
insubstantial to warrant a written opinion, the BIA member is 
prohibited from giving reasons for his or her decision.118 In fiscal year 
2002 (the year in which the BIA procedural reforms were 
announced), 31 percent of all BIA decisions were AWOs, in contrast 
to 6 percent the previous year.119 The corresponding percentages for 
the next two years were 36 percent and 32 percent, respectively, but 
they have since come down drastically, to 5 percent of all BIA 
decisions in fiscal year 2009.120 
Because writing a persuasive opinion takes time, BIA members 
with staggering caseload pressures and far too little time per case 
have a strong incentive to affirm rather than reverse. Consequently, 
and not surprisingly, the percentage of cases in which the BIA 
reversed immigration judge decisions dropped precipitously after the 
2002 reforms.121 The attorney general’s recent introduction of 
performance evaluations for both immigration judges and BIA 
members122 expands that incentive by emphasizing productivity.123 
 
 118. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2009). A still-pending proposed rule would make AWOs 
discretionary. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without Opinion, Referral for 
Panel Review, and Publication of Decisions as Precedents, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,654, 34,663 
(proposed June 18, 2008) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1); cf. ABA, supra note 87, at 8–9 
(also recommending that the BIA be required to respond to all nonfrivolous arguments); 
COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 32 (same). 
 119. Komis, supra note 73, app. question 18. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 7, app. 24; Alexander, supra note 7, at 12; 
Palmer et al., supra note 51, app. at 96 tbl.17; Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 358–59. 
 122. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales 
Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html. 
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Because immigrants file the overwhelming majority of the appeals to 
the BIA,124 the incentive to affirm is ordinarily an incentive to rule in 
favor of the government. 
A reasoned opinion is valuable for other reasons as well. It 
requires the adjudicator to consider the arguments of the losing side 
with care. When reasoned opinions can be omitted, affirmance 
without due care becomes easier. In addition, the very process of 
writing an opinion forces adjudicators to confirm that their tentative 
conclusions are the ones most compatible with the evidence and the 
law. 
Once an adjudicator renders a decision without explanation, the 
appellant also has no way to understand the rationale, less confidence 
that the decision was correct, and thus a greater incentive to seek 
judicial review. The reviewing court, for its part, then has to proceed 
without the starting point of a lower tribunal’s opinion and thus will 
have to spend time doing the BIA’s job. The court will also 
necessarily have less confidence in the BIA decision and more reason 
to reverse and remand to the BIA for further consideration or 
explanation. The cursory nature of the BIA review would be 
detrimental under any circumstances, but it takes on additional 
significance in a world in which the immigration judge decisions 
under review were themselves rendered under extreme time pressure 
and resource shortages. Moreover, reasoned BIA opinions not only 
 
 123. Copies of the separate performance evaluation forms for immigration judges and BIA 
members were supplied by Elaine Komis, Public Affairs Officer at EOIR, to the author on 
September 9, 2009. The immigration judge form includes ratings for “legal ability,” 
“professionalism,” and “accountability for organizational results.” EOIR, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Performance Appraisal Record: Adjudicative Employees 1 (n.d.) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). That last category then breaks down into several more specific criteria, of which 
criteria 2 and 3 focus expressly, and criterion 1 implicitly, on productivity. See id. at 3–5. The 
form for BIA members rates “organizational results,” “critical thinking and technical 
proficiency,” and “communication and teamwork.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Senior Level & 
Scientific Professional Performance Plan and Appraisal 1 (July 1, 2009) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal). Of these, “organizational results” count for 60 percent of the total score, and all 
of the specific criteria for evaluating “organizational results” relate to productivity. See id. at 2. 
The third category, “communication and teamwork,” counts for an additional 20 percent and 
contains only one criterion—“takes the initiative to assist . . . in meeting productivity 
expectations.” Id. at 4. The second criterion is the only one that seeks to measure the quality of 
adjudication, and it counts for only 20 percent of the final score. See id. at 3. Productivity, 
therefore, is the dominant theme. 
 124. The percentage of BIA decisions in which the immigrants had filed the appeals ranged 
from 85 percent to 93 percent during fiscal years 2001 through 2008, inclusive; the other 7 
percent to 15 percent were appeals that the government had filed. Komis, supra note 73, app. 
question 24. 
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provide guidance to the appellants whose cases they are deciding, but 
also (at least in cases designated as precedents) bind immigration 
judges and DHS officials.125 Without adequate guidance, DHS 
officials and immigration judges have to speculate about the BIA’s 
likely future interpretations. Speculation can only increase the 
number of reversals and remands, and spawn inconsistent treatment 
of similar cases. In addition, without reasoned opinions, it becomes 
easy for appellate adjudicators to base their decisions, consciously or 
unconsciously, on visceral reactions that reflect their own political 
outlooks, thus further eroding both accuracy and consistency. 
Single-member decisions are similarly suspect, for they, too, 
should be expected to engender the very problems discussed here. 
They will generally decrease the attention a case will receive, thereby 
increasing the error rate, and thus increasing the rate of further 
petitions to the courts of appeals. A panel of three members is less 
likely to miss obvious errors. Multimember panels also reduce the 
probability that a single individual with a strong ideology (in either 
direction) will reach an extreme result that the BIA as a whole would 
not have countenanced. They do this by diffusing subjective biases, 
permitting deliberation, and promoting consensus. In the process, 
multimember panel decisions minimize inconsistency in several 
ways,126 a crucial consideration in light of the drastic levels of 
inconsistency that have plagued immigration adjudicators.127 
Moreover, multimember panels permit dissenting opinions that can 
help steer future law. The exchange of ideas and the airing of 
differences of opinion have particular value in an arena in which so 
many cases are argued pro se and without legal briefs.128 For all these 
reasons, scholarly consensus has been that the 2002 BIA procedural 
 
 125. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2009). 
 126. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the 
Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 431–32, 447–49 (2007). 
 127. For criticisms of the inconsistency in immigration adjudications, see supra note 71 and 
accompanying text. 
 128. At the BIA level, the percentage of decisions in which the immigrants were 
represented by counsel ranged from 69 percent to 78 percent during fiscal years 2004 through 
2008, inclusive. EOIR, supra note 5, at W1 fig.30; see also ABA, Resolution 114E Withdrawn by 
the House of Delegates (Feb. 8–9, 2010), available at http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-
content/themes/ABANow/wp-content/uploads/resolution-pdfs/MY2010/114E.pdf 
(recommending various ways of enhancing access to counsel in removal cases); COMM’N ON 
IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 32 (same). The advantages of three-member panels have led the 
ABA to recommend requiring them in all nonfrivolous BIA appeals. See ABA, supra note 87, 
at 5–6; COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 32. 
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reforms were chiefly responsible for the sudden surge in petitions for 
review.129 
3. Suspect # 3: The Politicization of EOIR.  In addition to the 
underresourcing and the increased resort to procedural shortcuts, 
politicization has impaired the EOIR adjudicatory process. 
Components of this politicization include the hiring process, 
impediments to decisional independence, and a more general 
supervision and control of adjudicators by law enforcement officials. 
a. Hiring.  Immigration judges and members of the BIA are 
appointed by the attorney general.130 All of those adjudicators are 
“Schedule A” (career) appointees, as distinguished from “Schedule 
C” (political) appointees.131 For career employees, both federal law 
and Justice Department policies prohibit hiring discrimination on the 
basis of political affiliation.132 Until the spring of 2004, that 
nondiscrimination policy was honored; EOIR’s merit-based 
recommendations generally played the principal role in selecting 
immigration judges.133 
In response to allegations that the Bush administration had 
forced several U.S. attorneys to resign for improper political reasons, 
the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility and its 
Office of the Inspector General began a joint internal investigation 
into whether the Department had illegally based its hiring of career 
employees on candidates’ political affiliations or ideologies. 
Testifying under a grant of immunity before the U.S. House Judiciary 
Committee, the Department’s former liaison to the White House, 
Monica Goodling, confirmed the allegations.134 Based on her 
testimony and abundant additional evidence, the investigation 
revealed that, from 2004 to 2006, high officials from the White House 
 
 129. For a list of examples, see Alexander, supra note 7, at 11 n.62. A rare contrary view was 
expressed by former Attorney General Ashcroft, who ordered the 2002 BIA procedural 
reforms, and his chief immigration advisor at the time. See Ashcroft & Kobach, supra note 97. 
 130. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2006) (immigration judges); 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(l) (immigration 
judges); id. § 1003.1(a)(1) (BIA members). 
 131. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA 
GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 70–71 (2008), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf. 
 132. Id. at 12–15. 
 133. Id. at 72. 
 134. Id. at 1–2. 
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and the Department of Justice had bypassed the usual application 
procedures to appoint immigration judges based on their Republican 
Party affiliations or their conservative political views.135 In all but four 
cases, the hiring was accomplished without public competition, and 
more than half the appointees had no prior immigration experience.136 
In 2007, the attorney general instituted a new immigration judge 
appointment process in which EOIR would once again play the 
dominant role.137 Though the hope was that the new process would 
eliminate improper political interference, at least one appointment 
made by the Bush administration after the change in procedures 
likely rested primarily on political affiliation.138 At any rate, many of 
the illegally appointed immigration judges remain on the bench 
today.139 
Apart from the illegal behavior that dominated the process from 
2004 to 2006, hiring procedures continue to favor the appointment of 
immigration judges and BIA members whose work experiences 
incline them to prioritize immigration enforcement. As other 
commentators have shown, former ICE trial attorneys and their 
predecessors from the now defunct Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS), as well as other attorneys working for immigration 
enforcement agencies, are heavily represented among immigration 
judges and the BIA.140 These demographics are important because 
adjudicators with prior immigration enforcement experience are 
significantly more prone to rule in favor of the government than those 
without such experience—more so, in fact, the longer the duration of 
their prior INS or DHS employment.141 
I do not suggest it would be possible, or even desirable, to avoid 
appointing adjudicators with preexisting views on immigration issues. 
If prior immigration experience is valued, as it should be, preexisting 
views will be inevitable. Even those who are appointed without prior 
 
 135. Id. at 69–124. 
 136. Benedetto, supra note 7, at 474. For additional commentary on the hiring improprieties 
and the accompanying changes in the appointment process, see APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 7–
9; Marks, supra note 7, at 9; Emma Schwartz & Jason McLure, DOJ Made Immigration 
Judgeships Political, LEGAL TIMES, May 28, 2007, at 12. 
 137. See OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra 
note 131, at 114–15. 
 138. APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 8–9. 
 139. Id. at 7. 
 140. For further empirical evidence on this subject, see Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 
344–45. 
 141. Id. at 345–47. 
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immigration experience will surely have some preliminary thoughts—
perhaps even well informed and strongly held—on the subject. In any 
case, those views will develop soon enough. Consequently, every 
adjudicator will bring some measure of ideology to the position 
sooner or later. The key is to avoid affirmatively systematizing 
proenforcement biases. As others have recommended, recruiting 
should be broadened to ensure that candidates from career 
enforcement positions are not overrepresented.142 
b. Threats to Decisional Independence.  Targeted efforts by 
attorneys general or their delegates to influence specific immigration 
judge or BIA decisions are rare but not unknown. The most famous 
case was that of Joseph Accardi, an alleged mobster whose name had 
appeared on the attorney general’s list of “unsavory characters” 
whom he wished to deport.143 Shortly after the attorney general 
circulated the list, the BIA affirmed a denial of discretionary relief to 
Accardi.144 Holding that the attorney general’s regulations required 
the BIA to exercise independent judgment, the Supreme Court 
ordered the BIA to decide the case anew without considering the 
attorney general’s list.145 On remand, the BIA reached the same 
conclusion, which the Supreme Court accepted as free of undue 
influence.146 
Concerns about the unhealthy marriage of law enforcement and 
adjudicatory responsibilities persisted, however, especially given that 
the immigration judges were part of, and answerable to, the INS.147 In 
1983, therefore, the Justice Department took a major step to separate 
the two functions. It created EOIR, an umbrella agency that houses 
both the immigration judges and the BIA.148 The move insulated the 
immigration judges from the INS, but both immigration judges and 
the BIA remain accountable to the attorney general. 
 
 142. See APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 9. 
 143. United States ex rel. Shaughnessy v. Accardi, 347 U.S. 260, 264 (1954). 
 144. Id. at 263. 
 145. Id. at 268. 
 146. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280, 282–83 (1955). 
 147. For an excellent history, see Sidney B. Rawitz, From Wong Yang Sung to Black Robes, 
65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 453 (1988). 
 148. Board of Immigration Appeals: Immigration Review Function; Editorial Amendments, 
48 Fed. Reg. 8038, 8039 (Feb. 25, 1983) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a)). Since 
then, a third unit, the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO), has been 
added. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a) (2009). 
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Today, as was true after Accardi, regulations require both 
immigration judges and the BIA to exercise their discretion 
independently.149 Nonetheless, concerns occasionally arise. In 2001, an 
INS prosecutor who was dissatisfied with the ruling of an immigration 
judge in a removal case telephoned the chief immigration judge, ex 
parte, to complain. Rather than instruct the INS prosecutor that the 
proper remedy would be to appeal to the BIA,150 the chief 
immigration judge (an administrator who reports to the director of 
EOIR)151 directed the immigration judge to change his ruling. The 
immigration judge recused himself in protest over the chief 
immigration judge’s intervention.152 
These are isolated incidents. More worrisome have been the 
erosion of the immigration judges’ and BIA members’ job security 
and the real and perceived effects of that erosion on their decisional 
independence. Concerns about independence had long lingered in the 
background, but they emerged front and center in 2002. In February 
of that year (despite simultaneously introducing procedural shortcuts 
for the stated purpose of attacking the BIA backlog), Attorney 
General Ashcroft announced plans to reduce the number of BIA 
members from twenty-three to eleven.153 The final regulations, 
published approximately six months later, provided no details as to 
the criteria he would use in deciding which Board members to cull.154 
Finally, about one year after the original announcement, Ashcroft 
 
 149. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(2), 1003.10(b) (requiring the BIA and immigration judges, 
respectively, to exercise “independent judgment and discretion,” subject to the orders of the 
attorney general); see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW 
AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 287 n.97 (1987) (citing federal appellate decisions 
that require the BIA to independently exercise its powers). 
 150. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3) (allowing appeals to the BIA from decisions of immigration 
judges in removal proceedings). 
 151. Id. § 1003.9. 
 152. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 68, at 665–68 (giving the details of the 
case). 
 153. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 
Fed. Reg. 7309, 7310 (proposed Feb. 19, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003). 
 154. The attorney general referred generally to “traditional” factors, “discretion,” and 
qualities such as “integrity . . . , professional competence, and adjudicatorial temperament.” 
Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003). Seniority might 
be an “experience indicator” but not “a presumptive factor.” It would not be possible, the 
attorney general said, “to establish guidelines or specific factors that will be considered.” Id. 
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announced the names.155 A subsequent empirical study by former 
congressional counsel Peter Levinson demonstrated that the attorney 
general had “reassigned” (to either lower-level immigration judge 
positions or nonadjudicative positions on the EOIR staff) those 
Board members with the highest percentages of rulings in favor of 
noncitizens.156 The study showed that the selections bore no 
resemblance to the general criteria to which the final rule had 
referred—integrity, professional competence, and temperament.157 In 
total, five members158 were excised. They included the former chair of 
the Board, two former full-time immigration law professors, and 
other experienced and highly respected BIA members with 
substantial seniority.159 
These actions were unprecedented. In the then–sixty-three–year 
history of the BIA, no attorney general had ever before removed one 
of its members for any reason.160 During the one-year interval 
between the announcement of the impending cuts and the 
announcement of specific names, the effects of Attorney General 
Ashcroft’s decision were striking. The empirical study identified 
several BIA members whose percentages of rulings in favor of 
noncitizens dropped suddenly and substantially.161 The patterns of 
other BIA members whose rulings had historically been relatively 
favorable to immigrants did not change during the one-year transition 
period; only one of these members survived the purge.162 
 
 155. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar & Jonathan Peterson, 5 on Immigration Board Asked to 
Leave, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at A16 (identifying the five BIA members who were 
reassigned). 
 156. See Peter J. Levinson, The Facade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration 
Appellate Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1155–56 (2004). 
 157. See id. 
 158. Of the twenty-three then-authorized BIA positions, four were vacant at the time of the 
original 2002 announcement, and three other BIA members had left voluntarily before the 
announcement of names. Thus, only five “reassign[ments]” were necessary to reduce the Board 
to eleven members. Id. at 1155. 
 159. Id.; see also DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 7, at 12 (summarizing the 
biographies of the five reassigned BIA members). Analogous events occurred a few years 
earlier in Australia. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Refugees, Administrative Tribunals, and Real 
Independence: Dangers Ahead for Australia, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 248–53 (1998). 
 160. Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. 
REV. 369, 378–79 (2006). 
 161. See Levinson, supra note 156, at 1156–60 (comparing decisions before and after this 
downsizing). 
 162. See id. (noting that of the five Board members with the most liberal voting histories, 
four were reassigned). 
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These were only the transitional effects. Whether traceable to 
the elimination of the more immigrant-friendly BIA members, 
surviving members’ fears of losing their jobs in similar ways, 
procedural shortcuts, or a combination of these and perhaps other 
causes, the postpurge outcomes in BIA cases have been significantly 
less favorable to immigrants.163 
Consistent with the BIA member reassignments, Attorney 
General Ashcroft spoke more generally about the nature of BIA 
member (and by logical extension, immigration judge) positions and 
the attorney general’s powers over their continued service. The 
Department’s commentary accompanying the final rule stated: 
Each Board member is a Department of Justice attorney who is 
appointed by, and may be removed or reassigned by, the Attorney 
General. All attorneys in the Department are excepted employees, 
subject to removal by the Attorney General, and may be transferred 
from and to assignments as necessary to fulfill the Department’s 
mission.164 
Although the reassignments in question were limited to the BIA, the 
reference to “[a]ll attorneys” makes clear that the attorney general 
intended the quoted language to apply to immigration judges as 
well.165 
Moreover, as Peter Levinson has noted, the same final rule 
specifically amended the Justice Department’s regulations to 
downplay the significance of BIA independence. Before the new rule, 
the first sentence of the BIA regulations had unequivocally 
emphasized that BIA members were to “exercise their independent 
judgment and discretion in the cases coming before the Board.”166 The 
final rule changed that sentence to make the BIA members simply 
 
 163. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 7, app. 24 (charting the increase in 
affirmances after February 2002); Alexander, supra note 7, at 12 (noting that, among other 
factors, Board decisions in favor of noncitizens fell 15 percent); Palmer et al., supra note 51, at 
96 (showing seventy-two removals compared to eighteen nonremovals from a random sample of 
BIA decisions in 2004); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 358–59 (showing decreased rates 
of favorable remands in asylum decisions between 2000 and 2003). 
 164. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 
Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003). 
 165. See id. (emphasis added). Further, by twice distinguishing between removal and 
transfer to other assignments, the attorney general appears to have asserted a power not only to 
reassign, but also to remove from office entirely—a sweeping assertion indeed, unless the 
attorney general had only affirmative misconduct in mind for the latter. 
 166. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1) (2002). 
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“attorneys appointed by the Attorney General to act as the Attorney 
General’s delegates in the cases that come before them.”167 Only 
much later in the regulation does the reference to BIA independence 
finally appear, and then only in more qualified language.168 Coupled 
with the recently introduced performance evaluations that assess both 
productivity and quality of decisions,169 these actions remind surviving 
and future BIA members and immigration judges that they hold their 
jobs at the discretion of one of the opposing parties in the cases that 
come before them.170 
c. General Supervision and Control by the Attorney General.  
Apart from the subtle and not-so-subtle devices for influencing the 
adjudication of pending cases described in Section B.3.b, existing law 
supplies a number of other mechanisms through which attorneys 
general and their delegates supervise and control immigration judges 
and the BIA. One of the more direct instruments available for this 
purpose is the attorney general’s power to reverse BIA decisions 
 
 167. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2009). 
 168. See id. § 1003.1(d)(1)(i)–(ii) (subjecting the BIA’s independent judgment to the 
governing standards of “the provisions and limitations prescribed by applicable law, regulations, 
and procedures, and by decisions of the Attorney General”); Levinson, supra note 156, at 1161 
(discussing the changed language between the 2002 regulations and the 2003 regulations). 
 169. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
 170. Russell Wheeler questions whether immigration judges’ fears of retribution are 
widespread.  He observes that, unlike the BIA members, immigration judges have not actually 
been purged.  Moreover, he argues, if immigration judges acted out of a pervasive fear of 
intrusion, one would expect uniform results in favor of the government, a phenomenon that has 
not occurred.  Russell R. Wheeler, Response, Practical Impediments to Structural Reform and 
the Promise of Third Branch Analytic Methods: A Reply to Professors Baum and Legomsky, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1847, 1851–52 (2010).  It is true that immigration judges have not experienced an 
actual purge, and admittedly both their degree of fear and the magnitude of the effect it might 
have on their decisions would be nearly impossible to determine empirically.  In a survey of 
adjudicators, acknowledgments of bending the outcomes to meet superiors’ preferences are 
likely to be rare, even if that has indeed been the case and even if those propensities were all 
conscious and deliberate.  But I cannot agree that a pervasive fear would have been expected to 
produce a higher degree of uniformity.  Many variables might influence judges’ susceptibility to 
political pressures: family circumstances; financial pressures; whether they desire to remain in 
their present positions long term; the stages of their careers; the availability of other realistic job 
options; their own personal levels of courage, integrity, and personal and professional pride; and 
their own predictions about how much their supervisors will care about the particular issue and 
what their supervisors’ preferences will be.  The degree to which fear of adverse job 
consequences drives adjudicatory decisions will therefore vary from one adjudicator to another, 
and thus the absence of uniform outcomes tells us little or nothing about the magnitude of the 
problem.  Legomsky, supra note 160, at 397–98. 
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unilaterally.171 Though I have general objections to agency head 
review of adjudicatory decisions,172 I must acknowledge its common 
use as a tool for achieving agency coherence and agency policy 
primacy without the logistical burdens of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.173 In the present context, agency head review is 
particularly troublesome because the agency head is the attorney 
general, who serves as the nation’s chief law enforcement official. 
Allowing a law enforcement official to reverse the decision of an 
adjudicatory tribunal is problematic—particularly in proceedings in 
which the government is one of the opposing parties. 
In theory, empowering attorneys general to review and reverse 
BIA decisions makes them more politically accountable for the BIA’s 
shortcomings. In practice, that benefit is of small consolation. As the 
nation’s chief law enforcement officer, the attorney general has an 
inherent incentive to care more about some shortcomings than others. 
The legitimate interests in enhancing the speed of the 
decisionmaking, and thus the productivity, of the adjudicators and 
staff can conflict with other legitimate interests like the accuracy of 
outcomes and the fairness of procedures.174 The attorney general’s 
enforcement responsibilities might well dictate the relative priorities 
assigned to those conflicting interests. 
More generally, both the governing statute and the Justice 
Department’s regulations prescribe attorney general supervision of 
immigration judges.175 The attorney general appoints the director of 
EOIR,176 who in turn is “responsible for the direction and 
 
 171. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (requiring the BIA to refer cases to the attorney general on 
demand). 
 172. See Legomsky, supra note 126, at 458–62 (refuting arguments in favor of agency head 
review). The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform also objected to attorney general review 
of BIA decisions. See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 7, at 178 (listing the 
Commission’s qualms with agency head review and suggesting that review should be 
independent of enforcement). 
 173. See Legomsky, supra note 126, at 458–62 (discussing the popularity of agency head 
review); Paul R. Verkuil et al., Report for Recommendation 92-7: The Federal Administrative 
Judiciary, in 2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND REPORTS 771, 1004 (1992) (discussing formal agency review of adjudications). 
 174. Several scholars have considered the phenomenon of agencies’ tunnel vision. See, e.g., 
STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 11–19 (1994) (finding tunnel vision in 
the EPA’s hazardous waste cleanup policies); Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 781 (2004) (finding tunnel vision in the EPA’s general prioritization of 
its own programmatic goals). 
 175. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(l). 
 176. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a). 
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supervision” of the BIA and the immigration judges.177 The 
supervisory powers of the director of EOIR include the authority to 
set time frames for the disposition of cases and to evaluate the 
performances of the EOIR component parts and the individual 
adjudicators who staff them.178 The regulations specify that neither the 
director of EOIR nor the chair of the BIA may “direct the result of 
an adjudication,” but they qualify that prohibition by providing that it 
“shall not be construed to limit” the management authority of either 
the director of EOIR or the chair of the BIA.179 The qualification 
renders the prohibition on administrators directing the outcomes of 
cases ambiguous at best, and potentially meaningless at worst, as 
evidenced by the chief immigration judge episode outlined earlier.180 
Both the president of the National Association of Immigration Judges 
(NAIJ) and the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform have 
criticized this general scheme for allowing the nation’s chief 
prosecutor and law enforcement officer to direct and supervise 
adjudicatory tribunals.181 
The attorney general’s supervisory powers have generated 
several specific concerns, including the Department’s control over 
adjudicatory resources. Writing at a time when the immigration 
judges were not only within the Justice Department but also within 
the INS, former BIA Chair Maurice Roberts lamented a law 
enforcement agency’s control of adjudicatory resources. He observed 
that the local INS offices controlled immigration judges’ “office 
space, hearing facilities, equipment, supplies, clerical and 
transcription support, interpreter service, travel authorization and 
reimbursement, library and research facilities, calendars, maintenance 
of case files, and other services.”182 Today the immigration judges and 
the BIA members are within EOIR, a purely adjudicatory operation, 
but, as noted in this Section, the director of EOIR is still a 
subordinate of the attorney general. As Judge Marks, president of the 
 
 177. Id. § 1003.0(b)(1). 
 178. Id. § 1003.0(b)(1)(ii) (immigration judges and BIA); id. § 1003.1(a)(2)(i)(C)–(D) (BIA, 
powers subdelegated to the Chair of the BIA). 
 179. Id. §§ 1003.0(c), 1003.1(a)(2)(ii). 
 180. See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text. 
 181. See U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 7, at 178 (criticizing the 
agency head review model); Marks, supra note 7, at 3–4 (offering criticism of the system from 
the Honorable Dana Leigh Marks, current president of the NAIJ). 
 182. Roberts, supra note 7, at 8; see also Levinson, supra note 7, at 646 (describing 
immigration judges’ dependence on district directors and regional commissioners for practical 
necessities). 
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NAIJ, has pointed out, the attorney general is not only the nation’s 
chief law enforcement officer, but also the official responsible for the 
Office of Immigration Litigation, the agency that represents the 
government against the immigrant in federal court.183 To Judge 
Marks, an adjudicative tribunal’s dependence on an official 
responsible for both law enforcement and prosecution is unhealthy.184 
Beyond physical resources, the present chain of command has 
hindered immigration judges in another important way. In 1996, 
Congress granted immigration judges a contempt power to be 
exercised “under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.”185 
To date, however, the attorney general has never issued the necessary 
regulations, apparently because the former INS and its successors did 
not want their trial attorneys subject to discipline by other Justice 
Department attorneys, even if the latter are judges.186 The practical 
consequence has been that immigration judges have little leverage in 
enforcing deadlines against government attorneys, a handicap that 
often delays the completion of removal proceedings.187 
Attorney-general control over the adjudication system has also 
permitted the Justice Department to introduce several asymmetries, 
all of which consciously or unconsciously put a thumb on the scale in 
favor of the government and against the immigrant. The one-way 
effects of AWOs, which incentivize BIA affirmances, have already 
been noted in Section B.2.188 In addition, the Justice Department’s 
proposed Codes of Conduct expressly authorize immigration judges 
and BIA members to discuss pending cases ex parte with Department 
 
 183. Marks, supra note 7, at 3–4. 
 184. See id. at 4 (citing this shared responsibility as a flaw in the immigration court 
structure). 
 185. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, div. C, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-589 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(b)(1) (2006)). 
 186. Marks, supra note 7, at 10. 
 187. See Immigration Reform and the Reorganization of Homeland Defense: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Immigration of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 75 (2002) (statement 
of Dana Marks Keener, President, National Association of Immigration Judges); DANA MARKS 
KEENER & DENISE NOONAN SLAVIN, POSITION PAPER: AN INDEPENDENT IMMIGRATION 
COURT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 9 (2002), available at http://www.woodrow.org/ 
teachers/esi/2002/CivilLiberties/Projects/PositionPaperImmigrationJudges.pdf . 
 188. For the observations that AWOs take less time to produce than reversals with reasoned 
opinions and that affirmances, in turn, systematically favor the government because 85 to 93 
percent of all BIA appeals are filed by the immigrants, see supra notes 118–29 and 
accompanying text. 
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officials—but not with the immigrants (who are the opposing parties) 
or their counsel.189 
These various impediments to the decisional independence and 
neutrality of the immigration judges and the BIA are more 
consequential than they might first appear. The combination of the 
loss of decisional independence at the administrative level and the 
sweeping restrictions on judicial review enacted in 1996 has meant 
that, for broad categories of removal cases, there is no longer true 
decisional independence at any stage of the process.190 Part IV.C.1 
explores the implications of that loss more fully. 
4. Suspect # 4: The Bad Apples.  Every barrel of 232 people 
presumably has its bad apples, and the immigration judge corps is no 
exception. Ample anecdotal evidence demonstrates that the problem 
is not trivial. The courts of appeals have often issued blistering 
opinions not only identifying errors by immigration judges and the 
BIA on appeal, but also calling attention to incompetence, bias, 
hostility, intimidation, abuse, and other unprofessional conduct by 
some immigration judges.191 Some critics believe the problem is 
widespread,192 with one suggesting it has reached “crisis” 
proportions.193 
 
 189. See Codes of Conduct for the Immigration Judges and Board Members, 72 Fed. Reg. 
35,510, 35,511 (June 28, 2007) (“An immigration judge’s communications with other employees 
of the Department of Justice shall not be considered ex parte communications unless those 
employees are witnesses in a pending or impending proceeding before the immigration judge 
and the communication involves that proceeding.”); id. at 35,512 (“A Board Member’s 
communications with other employees of the Department of Justice shall not be considered ex 
parte communications unless those employees are witnesses or counsel involved in a pending or 
impending proceeding before the Board Member, and the communication involves that 
proceeding.”). 
 190. For the details of that argument, see LEGOMSKY, supra note 149, at 143–76. 
 191. See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (listing eleven examples); 
Qun Wang v. Attorney Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 267–69 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing additional 
examples, and condemning “[t]he tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm’’ of the 
immigration judge); Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding the 
immigration judge’s opinion “riddled with inappropriate and extraneous comments’’); Lopez-
Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding the immigration judge’s 
assessment of the asylum applicant’s credibility to be “skewed by prejudgment, personal 
speculation, bias, and conjecture”). 
 192. See, e.g., APPLESEED, supra note 7, at 12 (citing “a shocking number of examples of a 
lack of professionalism that infects Immigration Court proceedings”); Alexander, supra note 7, 
at 15–18 (giving examples and advocating for a public campaign against the worst immigration 
judges); Benedetto, supra note 7, at 492–500 (giving examples and urging ethical reforms). 
 193. Benedetto, supra note 7, at 469. 
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The anecdotal nature of the evidence and the inherent difficulty 
of quantifying subjective failings render the magnitude of the 
problem highly uncertain. Especially difficult is distinguishing those 
lapses that reflect the unsuitability of a given individual for a judicial 
position from those attributable to the crushing caseloads discussed 
earlier in this Section. In fairness to the many immigration judges 
whose reputations for competence and professionalism are beyond 
doubt, judgments about the number of true bad apples should be 
withheld until more systematic evidence is compiled. At present, one 
can reliably assume that the worst adjudicators have contributed to 
the problems afflicting EOIR, but the extent of that contribution is 
impossible to gauge responsibly. 
5. A Summary of the Causes.  This Section began with a warning 
that the lines between the various problems and their root causes 
sometimes run in two directions. Figure 1 attempts to summarize the 
lines of causation. 
 





























III.  THE USUAL PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The problems highlighted in Part II are serious, but plausible 
solutions exist. The nature of these problems suggests that any 
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effective reform must incorporate at least five general principles: 
First, there must be realistic funding to ensure adequate quality and 
quantity of adjudicators and their support staffs—especially law 
clerks and staff attorneys—as well as adequate physical resources. 
Second, for reasons discussed in Part IV.C.1, those who perform 
adjudicatory functions must have decisional independence. Third, 
greater efficiencies (both fiscal efficiencies and reductions of elapsed 
times) are critical. Fourth, for reasons discussed in Part IV.C.2, the 
generalist check needs to be preserved, preferably at the highest 
appellate level. And fifth, the procedural safeguards must be 
commensurate with the important individual and public interests at 
stake in removal cases. 
Only Congress, not the executive branch, can satisfy those 
principles. The funding decisions, the realignment of reviewing bodies 
essential to the kinds of efficiency gains I suggest in Part IV.C.4, and 
the retention of the generalist perspective that only the courts can 
supply are exclusively within the power of Congress. 
So, too, is the attainment of true decisional independence. 
Attorney General Ashcroft’s reassignment of the more immigrant-
friendly BIA members in 2003, reinforced by the other components 
of politicization discussed in Part II.B.3, has sent a message to 
immigration judges and BIA members that displeasing the attorney 
general could cost them their jobs. In theory, any attorney general 
could issue a regulation intended to restore the adjudicators’ job 
security, and I have no reason to doubt the good faith of the current 
attorney general. Enduring reforms, however, must focus on 
institutions, not individuals. No matter how much trust a given 
attorney general might inspire among subordinates, the genie is now 
out of the bottle. Every adjudicator will be aware that any action the 
DOJ takes to restore the adjudicators’ job security can be undone at 
any time by a successor administration or a successor attorney 
general. Thus, as long as the power to reassign lies with the 
administration, adjudicators can never again feel confident ruling 
against the government in close, controversial, or high-visibility cases. 
Consequently, only Congress, not the executive branch, can provide 
the level of job security that adjudicators need and deserve if they are 
to discharge their functions free of political pressures. 
Is there a congressional solution that would embody these five 
essential principles of a restructured immigration adjudication system: 
adequate funding, decisional independence, significantly enhanced 
efficiency, preservation of a generalist perspective, and sufficient 
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procedural safeguards? Several proposals have surfaced over time. 
They include an Article I immigration court; retention of the current 
structure but with greater job security for the adjudicators; and the 
conversion of EOIR into an independent tribunal outside the 
Department of Justice and all other executive departments. In this 
Part, I consider the benefits and drawbacks of each proposal. 
A. An Article I Immigration Court with Trial and Appellate Divisions 
Congress has created a number of Article I specialized courts, 
many of which remain in operation today and perform important 
functions.194 Over the years, several individuals and organizations 
have proposed converting the current immigration judges and BIA 
into an Article I immigration court with a trial division and an 
appellate division.195 The idea is commendable and in my view would 
be an improvement over the status quo. Nonetheless, I have two 
concerns: 
The first concern is a relative one. If the immigration judges and 
BIA members become Article I judges, it is safe to assume that 
Congress would not grant them the life tenure enjoyed by Article III 
judges. Presumably they would have fixed terms, like the judges on 
existing Article I courts.196 A fixed term, however, could theoretically 
be either renewable or nonrenewable. If it were nonrenewable, few 
accomplished people would aspire to these positions unless they were 
already immigration adjudicators or were nearing retirement, as their 
midcareer options would be limited when their terms expire. 
Renewable terms thus make more sense; in fact, fifteen-year 
renewable terms appear to be the norm for Article I courts.197 But if 
the terms are renewable, someone must exercise discretion about 
whether to renew a particular judge’s term (unless renewal were 
made statutorily pro forma in the absence of misconduct). And once 
renewal hinges on someone’s subjective judgment, the same fear that 
arose after Attorney General Ashcroft’s reassignments—that 
controversial, unpopular, or consistently pro-immigrant decisions 
 
 194. For a thorough summary, see Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative 
Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 731, 744–
51 (2003). 
 195. See supra note 7. 
 196. For statutes establishing term lengths for Article I judges, see infra note 197. 
 197. See 10 U.S.C. § 942(b)(2) (2006) (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces); 26 
U.S.C. § 7443(e) (2006) (U.S. Tax Court); 28 U.S.C. § 172(a) (2006) (U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims); 38 U.S.C. § 7253(c) (2006) (U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims). 
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would displease the repository of that discretion and trigger 
nonrenewal—could reemerge in another form. This vulnerability is at 
its peak when the decisionmaker is politically accountable, but even if 
the decisionmaker is an Article III judge relatively insulated from the 
political process, vulnerabilities would persist because, like anyone 
else, judges have ideological views and personality conflicts. In 
contrast, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) can be removed only for 
“good cause” and then only after evidentiary hearings before the 
Merit Systems Protection Board.198 Thus, though Article I judges 
might enjoy greater job security than immigration judges currently 
do, they might actually have less job security than they would under 
an ALJ model. 
If that were the only concern, one might find reassurance in the 
various other specialized Article I court models that rely on 
nonautomatic renewals.199 The larger concern is judicial review by the 
regional courts of appeals. Recent proposals by the National 
Association of Immigration Judges and the ABA for an Article I 
immigration court would preserve review by the regional courts of 
appeals.200 There is no guarantee, however, that Congress will accept 
these proposals in their entirety. In particular, it is not at all certain 
that Congress would preserve court of appeals review if it were to 
make EOIR an Article I court with its own appellate division. 
Congress has shown no compunctions about eliminating huge swaths 
of judicial review of deportation orders in the past, even without an 
Article I substitute.201 One worries that an Article I court with an 
appellate division would be the impetus to jettison regional court of 
 
 198. See 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2006); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for 
Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L. REV. 65, 72–74 (1996) (presenting a good summary of the 
statutory provisions governing appointment and terms of office of ALJs); Jeffrey Scott Wolfe, 
Are You Willing to Make the Commitment in Writing? The APA, ALJs, and SSA, 55 OKLA. L. 
REV. 203, 226 (2002); U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Qualification Standard for Administrative 
Law Judge Positions, http://www.opm.gov/qualifications/alj/alj.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
 199. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7253(c) (expressly contemplating additional fifteen-year terms for 
the judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims). For each of the other specialized 
Article I courts, renewability must be assumed; the statute authorizes appointments for fifteen-
year terms and contains no prohibition on appointment of a judge who has already served one 
such term. 10 U.S.C. § 942(b)(2); 26 U.S.C. § 7443(e); 28 U.S.C. § 172(a). 
 200. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 43–48; Marks, supra note 7, at 3, 15; see 
also Fitz & Schrag, supra note 7, § 101(a) (proposing a draft of a bill that would create an 
“independent, professional immigration court system”). 
 201. Most of the existing restrictions on judicial review of immigration decisions appear in 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2), and in other subsections of § 1252. For a summary of congressional efforts 
to trim judicial review of immigration decisions further, see Benson, supra note 7, at 413–14. 
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appeals review of deportation orders entirely. In that scenario, the 
generalist perspective would be lost. Indeed, the absence of a 
provision for review by generalist judges was the principal objection 
leveled against one of the early leading proposals for an Article I 
immigration court.202 
But suppose Congress were to replace EOIR with an Article I 
court that houses both trial and appellate divisions, and further 
suppose Congress preserves court of appeals review. Is even that the 
optimal solution? It would satisfy at least two of the five vital reform 
principles—decisional independence and the retention of a generalist 
perspective. If Congress were also to appropriate adequate funds and 
mandate sufficient safeguards, it could satisfy two additional 
principles. But it would not offer significant efficiency gains, for it 
would perpetuate a system that tolerates two largely duplicative 
rounds of appellate review. 
At first blush, one might question how duplicative these 
functions really are. After all, specialist tribunals and generalist courts 
offer different advantages. I have suggested elsewhere that, at least 
when the specialized forum is an administrative tribunal, it is usually 
“faster, cheaper, and procedurally simpler and less formal than 
courts.”203 Further, regardless of whether it is an administrative 
tribunal in the executive branch or a court in the judicial branch, 
specialized expertise is a valuable commodity. Courts, on the other 
hand, generally offer greater stature and decisional independence 
than administrative tribunals, in addition to contributing a valuable 
generalist perspective.204 Thus, a system that combines appellate 
review by a specialist tribunal with a right of review in a court of 
general jurisdiction admittedly offers advantages over a system that 
provides only one level of appellate review.205 
Moreover, one might argue, a second opportunity to spot errors 
has intrinsic value. On the surface, this assumption sounds reasonable 
enough, but the question remains why one should assume that, in 
cases in which the specialist tribunal and a generalist court disagree, 
 
 202. See Timothy S. Barker, A Critique of the Establishment of a Specialized Immigration 
Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 25, 25–27 (1980); Robert E. Juceam & Stephen Jacobs, 
Constitutional and Policy Considerations of an Article I Immigration Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 29, 33–34 (1980); James J. Orlow, Comments on “A Specialized Statutory Immigration 
Court,” 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 47, 50 (1980); Wildes, supra note 76, at 60–62. 
 203. LEGOMSKY, supra note 149, at 283. 
 204. The benefits of the generalist perspective are elaborated in Part IV.C.2, infra. 
 205. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 149, at 280–98. 
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the latter is more likely to be right. Do the benefits of generalist 
experience usually outweigh the benefits of specialized expertise? Is 
the reviewing court more likely to follow more elaborate procedures, 
proceed more deliberately, or have more decisional independence? 
Perhaps the answer to each of these questions is “yes, 
sometimes.” If the tribunal’s rationale is communicable in writing, 
then the court can receive the benefits of the tribunal’s accumulated 
specialist wisdom while also bringing the court’s own generalist 
perspective to bear on the issue. Unlike the administrative tribunal, 
which will not have had the benefit of the court’s generalist 
perspective, the court of appeals will have the best of both worlds. 
Admittedly, not all insights are fully communicable. Suppose, for 
example, the tribunal’s decision reflects its predictions, grounded in 
its practical experience, of the likely effects of a proposed decision. If 
those predictions are largely intuitive, its reasoning might not be 
easily transmitted. Even then, however, the combination of the 
court’s generalist perspective and due deference to the specialized 
practical experience of the tribunal might, at least theoretically, 
produce a better decision than if appellate review were limited to 
either a single specialized tribunal or a single generalist court. Thus, 
transmissible or not, the tribunal’s experiential insights and the 
court’s generalist perspective might make for a better decision than 
either forum would have been able to produce on its own.206 
Given these typically differing and often complementary 
properties of specialized tribunals and generalist courts, I must 
concede that a second appellate round can add value. Still, there will 
always be at least partial duplication of effort. I do not wish to 
exaggerate the duplication, given that some unknowable percentage 
of the second appeals will be easy cases capable of quick resolution. 
But the duplication will still be substantial, and, as I argue in Part IV, 
there is a way to realize the benefits of both kinds of adjudicative 
bodies without the inefficiency of a second appellate round. 
B. Legislating More Job Security within the Department of Justice 
Short of creating an Article I court, Congress could retain the 
existing structure of EOIR and simply legislate greater job security 
for the immigration judges and BIA members. Congress could, for 
example, make EOIR an independent tribunal within the 
 
 206. See id. at 292–98. 
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Department of Justice, as it did with the U.S. Parole Commission.207 
Either alternatively or additionally, Congress could make the 
immigration judges and the BIA members ALJs.208 The ALJ 
appointment process is freer of political influence, the ALJs’ grade 
levels and pay scales are set by the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM) rather than by political actors, and they cannot be removed 
from office except for good cause found after an evidentiary hearing 
before the Merit Systems Protection Board.209 Any of these options 
would restore the adjudicators’ decisional independence. If 
accompanied by both adequate funding and appropriate hearing and 
appellate procedures, they would satisfy other essential reform 
criteria as well. 
Like the Article I court proposal, however, each of these options 
would require either preserving the inefficiency of two levels of 
appellate review or eliminating the only generalist check on the 
process. Moreover, keeping EOIR within the Department of Justice, 
even under another name, would continue to subject adjudicators to 
the budgetary and other logistical decisions of the Department. At 
one time, I did not find this arrangement disturbing.210 Similarly, the 
president of the National Association of Immigration Judges, though 
preferring that EOIR be transferred to an independent executive 
branch agency, found its Justice Department location at least 
preferable to the then-contemplated transfer of EOIR to DHS.211 The 
2003 purge of BIA members and its ominous implications for 
adjudicators’ decisional independence from law enforcement 
superiors have forced both of us to eat our words and prescribe 
stronger medicine.212 Adjudicators’ dependence on law enforcement 
officials for not only job security but also daily office needs and 
procedural direction is highly problematic for all the reasons 
discussed earlier.213 When the former INS was part of the Department 
 
 207. Other commentators considered but ultimately rejected that possibility (at a time when 
the U.S. Parole Commission was a larger and more permanent agency). See, e.g., Levinson, 
supra note 7, at 650–51; Roberts, supra note 7, at 17–18. 
 208. This option, too, has been considered by others. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 7, at 
649; Roberts, supra note 7, at 16–17. 
 209. See supra note 198. 
 210. See Legomsky, supra note 6, at 1378–80. 
 211. See Immigration Reform and the Reorganization of Homeland Defense, supra note 187, 
at 76. 
 212. See Legomsky, supra note 160, at 405 (favoring an independent executive branch 
tribunal); Marks, supra note 7 (favoring an Article I immigration court). 
 213. See supra Part II.B.3.c. 
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of Justice, there might have been some reason to keep EOIR there as 
well, on a theory of agency policy coherence. Now that the INS is 
defunct, and its functions transferred to DHS, keeping EOIR in the 
Justice Department lacks even that advantage. 
C. Converting EOIR into an Independent Tribunal outside the Justice 
Department 
Another option is to make EOIR an independent tribunal, with 
trial and appellate divisions, but house it outside the Department of 
Justice and all other departments. Other such tribunals exist,214 and 
some have urged this model for what is now EOIR.215 Again, the 
immigration judges and BIA members could become ALJs in this 
new tribunal. 
In many ways, an independent adjudicatory tribunal is just an 
Article I court by another name. Both perform solely adjudicatory 
functions, both are in the executive branch, and both are independent 
of all existing government departments. Moreover, adjudicators in 
both bodies would be immune from the threat of removal from office 
because of disagreements over outcomes. By simultaneously 
providing job security to adjudicators and preventing the attorney 
general from exerting budgetary and logistical leverage or regulating 
their procedures, both models would avoid the major disadvantages 
of the internal Department of Justice option. 
Still, there are some differences between these two models.216 An 
Article I court would offer greater stature to adjudicators. Stature 
and respect might restore the existing immigration judges’ morale (if 
they are grandfathered or reappointed), and perhaps it would expand 
the pool of future applicants by making the positions more attractive. 
But an Article I court would also have comparative disadvantages. 
One writer fears that an Article I immigration court would require an 
 
 214. Examples include the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission and the 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. See Levinson, supra note 7, at 649 n.39, 
651; Verkuil & Lubbers, supra note 194, at 773. 
 215. See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 7, at 178–82; Orlow, 
supra note 202, at 50. The ABA Commission, which favors an Article I immigration court, has 
proposed the independent tribunal model as a fallback position. ABA, Resolution 114F 
Adopted by the House of Delegates 13–15 (Feb. 8–9, 2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
leadership/2010/midyear/daily_jourmal/114F.pdf; COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 
43–48. 
 216. See ABA, supra note 215, at 8–9 (emphasizing the stature and prestige of Article I 
judgeships); COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 45 (same). 
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“overjudicialized, formal process attendant to the to-be-created 
agency’s status as ‘court[,]’” thus sacrificing speed and flexibility.217 
This problem, however, could be solved simply by drafting rules of 
procedure that take into account the particular subject matter and 
any special needs it presents for procedural simplicity. 
Other considerations could become more consequential. The 
concern expressed in Section A—that an independent entity with an 
appellate division might prove too tempting a justification for 
Congress to abolish Article III review—might be exacerbated if the 
new entity is called a court, albeit one established under Article I. In 
addition, the usual selection process for an Article I court is 
presidential appointment followed by Senate confirmation,218 a 
process that some have specifically urged for an Article I immigration 
court.219 Each of the other Article I courts, however, has only between 
three and nineteen judges.220 A court with more than two hundred 
judges221 would constantly produce far more vacancies and thus 
require many more presidential appointments and Senate 
confirmation hearings. This volume would have taxed the Senate 
even in the past; it seems particularly ill suited to the highly charged 
current congressional climate, in which every confirmation hearing is 
a potential food fight. If Congress were to create an Article I 
immigration court but dispense with the usual presidential-Senate 
appointment process, however, this problem would not arise. 
Similarly, if the presidential-Senate appointment procedure were 
confined to the appellate stage, the problem would remain but the 
number of senatorial stalemates would be greatly reduced.222 
Finally, like both of the preceding options, the independent 
tribunal model would entail either entrenching the two largely 
 
 217. Orlow, supra note 202, at 49. 
 218. See 10 U.S.C. § 942(b)(1) (2006) (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces); 26 
U.S.C. § 7443(b) (2006) (U.S. Tax Court); 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2006) (U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims); 38 U.S.C. § 7253(b) (2006) (U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims). 
 219. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 7, at 3; Roberts, supra note 7, at 19; cf. Wildes, supra note 
76, at 54–55, 62 (lauding the presidential appointment process, though favoring either ALJs or 
an independent tribunal over an Article I immigration court). 
 220. See 10 U.S.C. § 942(a) (five judges); 26 U.S.C. § 7443(a) (nineteen judges); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 171(a) (sixteen judges); 38 U.S.C. § 7253(a) (three to seven judges). 
 221. As of August 20, 2009, there were 232 immigration judges. Komis, supra note 73, at 1. 
 222. The ABA Proposed Resolutions and Fitz and Schrag have proposed this arrangement. 
ABA, supra note 215, at 10; COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 68; Fitz & Schrag, 
supra note 7, § 102(a)(4). 
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duplicative rounds of appellate review or sacrificing the generalist 
Article III check on the process. 
IV.  AN ARTICLE III IMMIGRATION COURT 
STAFFED BY GENERALIST JUDGES 
Look for items that are of low cost to you and high benefit to them, 
and vice versa.223 
As one icon of negotiation theory emphasizes, a successful 
negotiator looks beyond positions to identify the motivating 
interests.224 Moreover, even when the interests of two negotiating 
parties conflict, a particular item might have a high benefit to one 
party and a low cost to the other.225 
Can these principles possibly be of use in a battlefield like 
immigration adjudication, in which the opposing sides seem so 
hopelessly at odds over both factual perceptions (are most asylum 
claimants genuine refugees or just people looking for a way to stay in 
the United States?) and priorities (do I care more about ensuring fair 
and accurate outcomes, or about speeding up the process and 
eliminating the backlogs at low fiscal cost?)? I argue here that, 
especially in this highly charged debate, focusing on the interests and 
priorities of the typically opposing sides can produce an agreement in 
which each side achieves what is most important to it while sacrificing 
only what is least important to it. 
What I have posited as the five critical elements of any effective 
reform of immigration adjudication—adequate funding, decisional 
independence, enhanced efficiency, the preservation of a generalist 
check, and fair procedures—are goals to which different actors assign 
different priorities. Each of them, however, is of vital importance to 
some. Consequently, a proposed reform that leaves any of these 
elements unsatisfied is likely to go nowhere. As Part III illustrates, 
although any number of reform models would represent substantial 
improvements over the status quo, each of the proposals considered 
to this point fails to meet at least one of these criteria. Among other 
things, each of them requires a choice between losing what remains of 
 
 223. ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 79 (2d ed. 1991). 
 224. Id. at 42. 
 225. Id. at 76. 
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a generalist, Article III check versus retaining a largely superfluous 
second round of appellate review. 
A. The Proposal 
As an alternative, I propose (a) converting the immigration 
judges into ALJs housed in an independent executive branch tribunal 
and (b) replacing both the BIA and review by the regional courts of 
appeals with an Article III immigration appellate court staffed by 
generalist judges. The details of this proposal and their rationales 
appear in Part IV.D, but the key elements can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. With respect to the immigration judges, I would adopt any one 
of the reform proposals discussed in Part III. The benefits of 
insulating these adjudicators from the Justice Department’s 
budgetary and logistical pressures inform my preference to convert 
the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge into a new, independent 
adjudicatory tribunal located within the executive branch but outside 
all departments. I would make the immigration judges ALJs because 
of the advantages of that arrangement over an Article I court.226 Until 
a more euphonious name is devised, the new tribunal could be called 
the Office of the Administrative Law Judges for Immigration 
(OALJI), and the adjudicators would be Administrative Law Judges 
for Immigration (ALJIs). My proposal calls for a qualified 
grandfathering of the current immigration judges. Subsequent 
appointments would be made by a special Commission described in 
Section D.1.a. 
2. This proposal would establish a new Article III United States 
Court of Appeals for Immigration to replace both the BIA and the 
current role of the regional courts of appeals in immigration cases. 
The jurisdiction of the new court would generally track that of the 
current BIA, thus indirectly repealing the 1996 bars on Article III 
review of large categories of removal orders. The new court could sit 
in one centralized location or have multiple seats, as discussed in Part 
IV.B.7. 
3. I would staff the new court with generalist Article III judges 
drawn from the U.S. district courts and regional courts of appeals for 
fixed terms, for example two years. For this purpose, each circuit 
would contribute district and circuit judges proportionately to the 
 
 226. See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text. 
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total number of district and circuit judges in that circuit. The Judicial 
Council of each circuit would make selections from the pool of 
eligible judges. Only active Article III judges with a minimum 
number of years of service on federal courts of general jurisdiction (I 
propose three years) would be eligible for the regular two-year 
assignments to this new court. To fill a temporary need for additional 
judges, it would be possible to assign other active judges and senior 
judges to the new court on an ad hoc basis. 
4. The new court would have its own support staff, including both 
permanent and term law clerks and staff attorneys. 
5. Both parties—the immigrant and DHS—would have the 
statutory right to appeal the decision of the ALJI to this new court, 
just as they now both have the right to appeal to the BIA. The new 
court would also have jurisdiction over several miscellaneous orders 
that roughly parallel the current jurisdiction of the BIA. 
B. Constitutionality 
Before assessing the policy implications of this proposal, it is 
necessary to address one preliminary question: is it constitutional? 
Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution vests the 
federal judicial power in a supreme court and any inferior courts that 
Congress chooses to establish.227 It then provides that the judges of 
both the supreme and inferior courts “shall hold their Offices during 
good Behaviour” and that their compensation shall not be reduced 
while they remain in office.228 These provisions protect federal judges’ 
decisional independence by insulating them from political pressures. 
Nowhere, however, does the constitutional text say that all 
federal adjudication must be by Article III judges. Otherwise all 
federal administrative adjudicatory tribunals would be 
unconstitutional. Rather, the Supreme Court has marked out the 
limitations on non–Article III adjudication. In three leading cases,229 
the Court has held that non–Article III courts and tribunals may 
adjudicate public rights, and that they apparently may adjudicate 
 
 227. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853–56 (1986); 
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68–71 (1982); Crowell v. 
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 48–53 (1932). See generally MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, 
STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.3 (3d ed. 2009) (examining Congress’s power 
to delegate adjudicatory authority to agencies). 
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even private rights provided that an Article III court has independent 
power to decide all questions of law and jurisdictional fact. Although 
the line is not entirely clear, it appears that for these purposes, public 
rights are those arising between the government and private persons, 
whereas private rights are those that involve the liability of one 
individual to another.230 
Thus, there is no apparent Article III problem here. First, 
whatever ambiguities the distinction between private rights and 
public rights might generate in other contexts, the rights adjudicated 
in removal proceedings are public rights under any imaginable 
standard, because they arise as between the individual immigrant and 
the government. Indeed, in Crowell v. Benson,231 the Supreme Court 
specifically mentioned immigration as a “familiar’’ example of a 
public right.232 Second, my proposal encompasses independent review 
by an Article III court. Third, the current system already lodges the 
adjudicatory power in an administrative tribunal (EOIR), and the 
only issue is whether to transfer that authority to either a more 
independent adjudicatory tribunal within the executive branch or (for 
appellate review) an Article III court. As such, my proposal does not 
raise any constitutional issues not already present in the seemingly 
uncontested existing structure. To the contrary, it expands the role of 
Article III judges in immigration cases. From this point on, therefore, 
constitutionality will be assumed. 
C. Policy Benefits and Costs 
The adjudication model urged in this Article has several 
important policy advantages over both the status quo and the other 
reform proposals discussed in Part III. It would depoliticize what is, 
and should be, an adjudicatory process. Further, it would preserve 
both specialized expertise and the generalist perspective in appellate 
review. Additionally, it would repeal the principal restrictions that 
Congress placed on Article III judicial review of removal orders in 
1996. By consolidating the current two rounds of largely duplicative 
appellate review into one, this proposal would promote fiscal 
efficiency and speed final dispositions. Because the judges assigned to 
the new court would be generalists drawn from the district courts and 
the courts of appeals, this proposal would offer judicial councils the 
 
 230. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69–70. 
 231. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
 232. Id. at 50. 
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flexibility to reassign judges to their original posts if caseload 
fluctuations warrant. 
Costs must be acknowledged. Centralization, though possibly 
contributing to more uniform results, lessens the opportunity for 
beneficial cross-court discourse, creates various logistical challenges 
concerning panel deliberation and oral argument, and potentially 
concentrates more than optimal power in a single institution. 
Moreover, some significant percentage of the federal district and 
circuit judges are likely to be unenthusiastic about the prospect of a 
two-year assignment to the new court. The discussion in the 
remainder of this Section suggests that these costs, although real, are 
either minor or easily mitigated. 
1. Depoliticization.  This proposal aims to depoliticize the 
immigration adjudication process in several ways. At the hiring stage, 
the proposal would substitute ALJs for the current immigration 
judges and Article III judges for BIA members. The tawdry hiring 
practices that so badly tarnished EOIR and other components of the 
Department of Justice have since been corrected,233 but without 
congressional action, nothing prevents future Justice Department and 
White House officials from lapsing. The ALJI hiring process 
proposed here is merit based. Similarly, BIA review would give way 
to review by Article III judges. Appointments of federal judges are 
admittedly political, but the requirements of presidential nomination 
and Senate confirmation provide transparency and at least some 
degree of merits scrutiny. 
One special problem deserves mention. The Article III judges 
who are assigned to the Court of Appeals for Immigration would 
ultimately be selected by other judges.234 As Professor Theodore 
Ruger has observed, assignments of judges by other judges are not 
without problems.235 Several statutes, for example, have authorized 
the Chief Justice of the United States to reassign judges temporarily 
to different courts.236 These arrangements eliminate the democratic 
safeguards of appointment by politically accountable actors—the 
president and the Senate. Moreover, a Chief Justice can select judges 
 
 233. See supra notes 134–40 and accompanying text. 
 234. The proposed assignment procedure is detailed in Part IV.D.2.a, infra. 
 235. Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 341, 343–47 (2004). 
 236. Id. at 343 nn.5–8, 359–67. 
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with particular political viewpoints. That power is especially 
problematic when an assignment is to a specialized court, because it 
permits the appointment of judges who hold particular views 
concerning the particular subject matter—a virtual recipe for 
manipulating the outcomes of cases.237 By matching specific judges to 
specific subject matters, this practice also violates the norm of random 
assignment of judges to cases.238 The problem is not academic. As 
Ruger shows, at least two Chief Justices (Rehnquist and, to a lesser 
extent, Burger) often made strategic assignment choices based on 
their own substantive preferences.239 
My proposal does not eliminate these dangers, as some judges 
would still appoint or assign other judges. At both the trial level and 
the appellate level, however, the proposal diffuses the selection 
power by spreading it out among a collective group, thus greatly 
diminishing these various concerns. 
Hiring aside, my proposal is designed to restore decisional 
independence at both the trial and appellate levels of immigration 
adjudication, principally by enhancing the job security of 
adjudicators. Unlike the current immigration judges and BIA 
members, the ALJIs and Article III judges of the Court of Appeals 
for Immigration need not be concerned that one of the opposing 
parties is a law enforcement agency. That party would no longer have 
the power to terminate their employment if it were unhappy with the 
decision. 
Admittedly, decisional independence—meaning adjudicators’ 
freedom to decide cases as they believe the evidence and the law 
dictate—has costs. As discussed in more detail elsewhere,240 these 
costs relate to the inherent absence of political accountability, 
inappropriate judicial activism, potential public backlash, and 
possible impediments to agency policy coherence. 
When the function of a public actor falls clearly within the realm 
of adjudication, however, the usual assumption has been that the 
 
 237. Id. at 343–44. 
 238. Id. at 372. See generally Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2009) (defending random assignments of cases to judges). 
 239. Ruger, supra note 235, at 390–95; see also Theodore W. Ruger, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s Appointments to the FISA Court: An Empirical Perspective, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 
240 (2007) (demonstrating empirically that Chief Justice Rehnquist disproportionately assigned 
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA) those judges who held conservative views 
on the specific fourth amendment issues that FISA was charged with deciding). 
 240. Legomsky, supra note 160, at 392–94. 
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benefits of decisional independence outweigh its costs. If 
“adjudication” is “the power to determine the rights or duties of 
particular persons based on their individual circumstances,”241 then 
the decisions that immigration judges, the BIA, and the courts of 
appeals now make in removal cases obviously qualify. 
The benefits of decisional independence in an adjudicative 
context are compelling. Most importantly, decisional independence is 
rooted in theories of procedural justice. People who decide cases 
should base their decisions on their honest assessments of the 
evidence and their honest interpretations of the relevant law, not on 
the basis of which outcomes are most likely to please the officials who 
have the power to fire them. In addition, decisional independence 
serves to avoid defensive judging (playing it safe); to protect 
unpopular individuals, minorities, and viewpoints; to operationalize 
separation of powers; to nourish public confidence in the integrity of 
the justice system; to prevent “reverse social Darwinism,” in which 
the most honest and most courageous adjudicators are the ones first 
culled from the herd; to make the positions attractive enough to 
recruit the most talented candidates; and to sustain a continuity of 
interpretation from one administration to the next.242 To be clear, 
none of these considerations should immunize an adjudicator from 
discipline or even removal for unprofessional conduct. But sanctions 
grounded in policy-based or ideological differences with one’s 
superiors are another matter. 
Finally, this proposal seeks to end the general supervision and 
control of an adjudicative body by a law enforcement agency. As 
discussed in Part II.B.3.c, allowing law enforcement officials not only 
to reverse the decisions of adjudicators, but also to control staffing 
and other resources that adjudicators require, has created an 
unhealthy state of dependency. 
All these effects of depoliticization assume larger significance 
when one considers that existing law bars judicial review of large 
categories—perhaps a majority—of final removal orders.243 This 
proposal, therefore, neutralizes the 1996 court-stripping legislation. 
Instead of a right to appeal all immigration judge removal orders to 
 
 241. ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 229, at 398. 
 242. These and other theories of decisional independence are discussed in Legomsky, supra 
note 160, at 394–401. 
 243. For a summary of the more important 1996 constraints on judicial review of removal 
orders, see supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
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the BIA, this proposal would create a right to appeal those same 
decisions to an Article III Court of Appeals for Immigration. Thus, 
all removal orders, including those that rest on discretionary decisions 
and those involving the crime-related deportability grounds, would 
again become reviewable by independent, Article III judges with 
generalist backgrounds—but instead of, not in addition to, review by 
the BIA. 
2. Generalists and Specialists.  Assigning federal district and 
circuit judges to two-year rotations on a new U.S. Court of Appeals 
for Immigration is a have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too solution. In the 
past, one of the most serious objections to replacing the regional 
courts of appeals with a single specialized immigration appellate court 
has been the loss of the generalist perspective.244 At the same time, my 
proposed abolition of the BIA—essential if the present two rounds of 
appellate review are to be consolidated into one—necessitates some 
alternative source of specialized expertise. This proposal addresses 
both needs by staffing a specialized court with judges who have had 
several years of experience on federal courts of general jurisdiction. 
Rotational assignments to specialized courts are not a novel idea, but 
the few known examples have entailed only standby arrangements, in 
which judges continue to serve full time on their home courts except 
when particular cases require their temporary services on the 
specialized courts.245 In those regimes, the judges have had far less 
opportunity to develop significant specialized expertise. 
Professor Lawrence Baum makes the excellent point that some 
judges on the existing regional courts of appeals have already 
acquired a good deal of specialized expertise simply by having 
 
 244. See Barker, supra note 202, at 27; Juceam & Jacobs, supra note 202, at 33–34; Orlow, 
supra note 202, at 60–62. 
 245. FISA is the most significant example. The Chief Justice of the United States assigns 
eleven district judges, at least three of whom must live within twenty miles of Washington, D.C. 
They travel to the court as needed. Fed. Judicial Ctr., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/fisc_bdy (last visited Mar. 30, 2010); U.S. Courts, The 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Court of Review, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
outreach/topics/fisa/courtofreview.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). The Temporary Emergency 
Court of Appeals was the other major example. The Chief Justice was authorized to appoint 
three or more district or circuit judges to serve part time for indefinite terms. It was abolished in 
1992 and its jurisdiction was transferred to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
Fed. Judicial Ctr., Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, 1971–1992, http://www.fjc.gov/ 
history/home.nsf/page/temp_appeals!OpenDocument&Click= (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). 
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handled a large number of immigration cases.246 Outside the Second 
and Ninth Circuits, however, the number of judges who could 
realistically claim that kind of expertise is small.247 At any rate, the 
court I am proposing would be a different animal entirely. The judges 
would be totally immersed in immigration law for two years. They 
would constantly learn from one another, from a specialized support 
staff with institutional memory, and from specialized books and other 
resources. Moreover, because the judges will be adjudicating nothing 
but immigration cases for two years, it will be worthwhile to invest in 
their continuing specialized education. 
What, precisely, does specialized expertise contribute to 
adjudication?248 In several ways, it enhances the quality of the final 
decisions. Specialists’ knowledge of the governing statutory scheme 
and their repeated exposure to the practical consequences of past 
interpretations can help them reach results that are both faithful to 
the law and pragmatic.249 Experts should be well equipped to identify 
the right questions; they will also be more familiar with recurring 
legislative facts and related statutory provisions that add context to 
the provisions they are interpreting. This knowledge lessens their 
dependency on counsel and staff for basic information and mitigates 
the risk that a party will win or lose because of an imbalance in the 
skills or efforts of the opposing attorneys. When parties appear pro 
se, the expertise of the adjudicator can be at least a partial substitute 
for counsel. In addition to the knowledge that the adjudicators 
themselves furnish, the structure of a specialized court enables judges 
to draw on the collective wisdom of their specialized colleagues, a 
 
 246. Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of Immigration Cases, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1501, 1550–51 (2010). 
 247. Id. at 1550–52. 
 248. For a more comprehensive catalog of the benefits and costs of specialized adjudication, 
see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, SPECIALIZED JUSTICE: COURTS, ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS, 
AND A CROSS-NATIONAL THEORY OF SPECIALIZATION 7–19 (1990). 
 249. David R. Woodward & Ronald M. Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of 
Agency Action, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 320, 329, 332 (1979). Others have similarly hailed specialists’ 
“superior degree of technical competence,’’ as well as their abilities to predict pragmatically 
whether nonliteral interpretations would “unsettle the statutory scheme.” Cass R. Sunstein & 
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 928 (2003). As an 
argument for affording specialist decisionmakers more leeway than generalist judges to depart 
from the literal statutory text, these latter assertions have drawn a sharp rebuke from Judge 
Richard Posner. He argued that specialized expertise can lead to loose construction (a result he 
disfavors) and that many “generalist’’ judges also possess specialized expertise, for example in 
evidence law or criminal law. Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of 
Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 952, 964 (2003). 
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specialized support staff, and specialized books and other resources. 
Familiarity with the relevant cases can help create a consistent body 
of case law—by reducing the chance of overlooking a case on point, 
by avoiding unintentionally broad or misleading language in opinions, 
and by affirmatively contributing helpful dicta. Specialized courts can 
further enhance consistency by concentrating decisionmaking in a 
smaller number of individuals. 
These benefits assume particular importance in immigration. As 
the Introduction to this Article points out, the statutes, regulations, 
and case law that govern U.S. immigration law are exceptionally 
large, complex, and organizationally intricate. The law is also 
unusually dynamic. Understanding the overall design of the statutory 
scheme and keeping up with developments are correspondingly 
challenging in this field. Moreover, many fact patterns recur. Those 
who adjudicate asylum cases, for example, must often assess the 
human rights practices that prevail in the particular countries from 
which the applicants are fleeing.250 Familiarity with common fact 
patterns facilitates both broader understanding and consistent 
outcomes. 
Apart from its contribution to accurate decisions, specialized 
expertise enhances the efficiency of the process. All else equal, for a 
given level of accuracy, one who is familiar with the general legal 
backdrop should require less time to decide cases than one who has to 
start from scratch. The specialized adjudicator should also need less 
background information from counsel. These efficiencies allow the 
tribunal and the parties to devote their time and resources to less 
repetitive and more productive tasks. 
Specialization also has costs, but my proposal largely eliminates 
them. The most obvious cost is the loss of the generalist perspective; 
the present proposal preserves the generalist perspective by insisting 
on a minimum amount of experience on a federal court of general 
jurisdiction. Views and attitudes might ossify more readily among 
specialists, who have had abundant time and occasion to develop 
their views, and cynicism might develop over time. The generalist 
judges who would staff the new U.S. Court of Appeals for 
Immigration will arrive without the same opportunities to have 
 
 250. Protection will generally hinge on whether an applicant’s fear of persecution in another 
country is “well-founded,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2006), or on whether the applicant’s life or 
freedom “would be threatened” in a particular country, id. § 1231(b)(3). Those determinations 
require assessments of relevant country conditions. 
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formed those biases and rigidities, and at any rate they will rotate out 
after two years. 
Finally, one persistent fear concerning specialized tribunals and 
courts is that their specialization gives unhealthy incentives to others 
to influence their selection and subsequently their decisions. When a 
person’s full-time job will be the adjudication of cases within one 
narrowly defined subject area, special interests have a greater 
incentive to lobby for or against appointment, and the authorities 
who make the appointments have a greater incentive to choose 
someone who is similarly minded. After appointments, the danger of 
capture by special interests becomes more evident.251 Again, the 
proposed reform would greatly minimize those problems. Potential 
lobbyists will not know in advance which federal judgeship nominees 
will one day serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals for Immigration. The 
judges would not occupy those roles until at least three years in the 
future, their assignments to the new court would be in the hands of a 
collective group of judges rather than a single individual, and the 
short duration of the assignment (two years) further minimizes both 
the profit in lobbying and the opportunity for capture. 
There are also important affirmative advantages to adjudication 
by generalists.252 Judges with generalist experience can draw guidance, 
analogies, and inspiration from other judicial contexts and can 
approach cases with fewer and less-entrenched biases and 
preconceptions. A more varied diet of cases might also expand the 
recruitment pool by inducing talented individuals to seek out 
judgeships or professional staff positions. All of these advantages 
have special salience in immigration law, because liberty interests are 
at stake and the complex agency framework makes a broad 
knowledge of administrative law exceptionally useful. Again, the 
proposed framework would utilize that generalist experience by 
limiting eligibility for service on the new court to those judges who 
 
 251. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 248, at 16; Verkuil & Lubbers, supra note 194, at 756–58 
(discussing the effects of specialization on lobbying); Id. at 767 n.181 (acknowledging concerns 
that veterans’ groups have captured the Board of Veterans’ Appeals and the Article I U.S. 
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims). 
 252. See Jason Rathod, Note, Not Peace, but a Sword: Navy v. Egan and the Case Against 
Judicial Abdication in Foreign Affairs, 59 DUKE L.J. 595, 617–18 (2009) (invoking the benefits 
of a generalist perspective as part of an argument for judicial review of agency security 
clearance determinations). See generally LEGOMSKY, supra note 248, at 7–19 (discussing the 
benefits and costs of judicial specialization). 
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had accumulated the requisite experience on a federal court of 
general jurisdiction. 
3. Fix ‘96.  As discussed in Section D.2.b, this proposal would 
give the new immigration court jurisdiction that roughly parallels that 
of the current BIA. By doing so, it would effectively negate some of 
the more severe constraints that Congress placed on judicial review of 
removal orders in 1996. Until that year, virtually all administratively 
final deportation orders (as they were then called) were reviewable in 
the courts of appeals.253 In 1996, however, Congress slashed judicial 
review in numerous ways. Among the most important of these 
restrictions were the bars on review of most discretionary decisions 
and most crime-related removal orders.254 The inability to appeal 
discretionary decisions has had special impact, because, as noted 
earlier, the vast majority of noncitizens in removal proceedings apply 
for various forms of discretionary relief.255 
Because my proposed Court of Appeals for Immigration would 
assume essentially the same jurisdiction as the current BIA, the 
practical effect would be to restore the Article III judicial review that 
was lost in 1996. The familiar benefits of Article III judicial review of 
administrative tribunal decisions, in turn, are ample and discussed 
elsewhere.256 
4. Fiscal Cost and Waste.  This proposal substantially reduces 
fiscal waste and, most likely, overall fiscal costs. Initially, that claim 
might seem counterintuitive. After all, the time of federal judges is 
typically more costly than the time of the BIA members who decide 
these cases today. Nonetheless, the proposed new system would 
reduce costs in four ways: 
First, for a given number of cases per adjudicator and cases per 
law clerk, the costs actually turn out to be lower for the federal courts 
than they are for the BIA. Federal judges’ salaries are higher than 
 
 253. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1994). 
 254. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, div. C, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-607 to -608 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)–(C) (2006)) (amending section 242(a)(2)(B)–(C) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act). The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.), clarified that both of these bars were subject to exceptions for questions of 
law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 
 255. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
 256. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 149, at 272–98. 
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those of BIA members, but only slightly. The current salaries of 
circuit judges and district judges are $184,500 and $174,000, 
respectively;257 BIA members’ salaries range from $162,900 to 
$171,180258—very close to the salaries of the district judges who would 
make up the vast majority of the new appellate adjudicators under my 
proposal. More than offsetting that small differential is the fact that 
the salary range of the BIA staff attorneys (formally called attorney 
advisors) is much higher than that for federal court law clerks. The 
BIA attorney advisors earn between $86,927 and $153,200 per year.259 
For federal law clerks, the salary varies with location, but in cities 
other than those specifically designated, the usual starting salary is 
$56,411 (including a cost of living allowance).260 For the minority of 
federal law clerks who serve a second year (and who have been 
admitted to Bar membership), the salary, in cities other than those 
designated, is $67,613.261 And in both the BIA and the federal courts, 
the law clerks (or attorney advisors at the BIA) far outnumber the 
judges (BIA members).262 Thus, the much higher clerk salaries at the 
 
 257. COLA for Federal Judges in 2009, THE THIRD BRANCH (U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.), 
Mar. 2009, at 3, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/2009-03/article03.cfm?WT.cg_n=TTB_ 
Mar09_article03_tableOfContents. 
 258. Komis, supra note 73, at 2. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Recent law school graduates usually qualify for grade JSP-11, step 1 appointments; 
after one year of postgraduation experience and Bar membership, the grade is usually JSP-12, 
step 1. Online System for Clerkship Application and Review, Qualifications, Salary and 
Benefits, https://oscar.uscourts.gov/drupal/print/18 (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). Including the cost 
of living allowance for all cities other than those specifically listed, the 2009 annual salary for 
JSP-11, step 1 is $56,411; for JSP-12, step 1, it is $67,613. U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL SALARY PLAN 
PAY RATE TABLE 01: REST OF THE UNITED STATES (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
careers/Pay_Tables/2009_Pay_Tables/Judiciary_Salary_Plan_Pay_Tables/Base_and_Locality_Pa
y_Tables/JSP01.pdf. For salaries for specific cities, see, for example, U.S. Courts, Judicial Salary 
Plan Locality Rate Pay Tables 2009, http://www.uscourts.gov/careers/Judicial_Salary_Plan_ 
Locality_Rate_Pay_Tables_2009.cfm (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). 
 261. See supra note 260. 
 262. The number of authorized federal judgeships for each court is set by statute. See 28 
U.S.C. § 44 (2006) (authorizing judgeships for the courts of appeals); id. § 133 (authorizing 
judgeships for district courts). As of March 30, 2010, there were 167 authorized active 
judgeships in the regional courts of appeals (excluding the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit) and 667 in the district courts. U.S. Courts, Federal Judiciary Judges and Judgeships, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2010) (linking to Authorized 
Judgeships). In contrast, as of August 16, 2009, the active circuit judges employed 468 full-time 
equivalent law clerks (410 term law clerks, fifty-eight career law clerks).  E-mail from Gary 
Bowden, Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, to author (Sept. 20, 2009) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). Active circuit judges also employed approximately five hundred staff attorneys. See 
Office of the Circuit Exec., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Staff Attorneys’ 
Offices: Allocation of Work Units FY 2009 (Mar. 4, 2009) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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BIA easily outweigh the slightly higher adjudicator salaries in the 
federal courts. 
I am not suggesting that the cost per case is currently greater at 
the BIA than in the courts of appeals. Because the current norms are 
single-member decisions at the BIA and three-judge panels in the 
courts of appeals, and because the BIA members and their staff 
attorneys have been assigned far heavier caseloads than their 
respective counterparts in the courts of appeals, any comparison 
based on current staffing arrangements and panel sizes would be 
skewed. Those arrangements are themselves the products of 
conscious policy choices. Whether appellate adjudication of removal 
orders lies with the BIA, the courts of appeals, my proposed Article 
III Court of Appeals for Immigration, or any other tribunal to which 
Congress wishes to grant jurisdiction, Congress could choose 
whatever staffing levels and panel sizes it thinks optimal. A fair 
comparison, therefore, must assume a constant caseload per 
adjudicator, a constant caseload per staff attorney or law clerk, and a 
constant panel size. Of course, except for the salaries of the federal 
Article III judges, the salary ranges of the relevant personnel could 
also be changed. At least under the current salary ranges, the data 
supplied above demonstrate that, for a given total caseload, a given 
number of adjudicators and support staff, and a given panel size, BIA 
review, surprisingly, is more expensive than court of appeals review. 
Positing a given total caseload, however, assumes that the 
current rate of appeal from the immigration judges’ decisions to the 
BIA (approximately 30 percent in fiscal year 2008)263 will carry over to 
appeals from the proposed ALJs for Immigration to the proposed 
U.S. Court of Appeals for Immigration. In fact, the rate at which the 
decisions of immigration judges or their successors are appealed 
might either increase or decrease. On the one hand, future increases 
in immigration enforcement could increase the total number of 
immigration judge decisions and therefore the total number of 
appeals. In addition, the drop in the rate of appeals from immigration 
judge decisions to the BIA from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008 
(from 16 percent to 9 percent)264 might reflect the current economic 
 
The active district judges employed another 1,379 full-time equivalent law clerks (936 term and 
443 career). E-mail from Gary Bowden, supra. The Board of Immigration Appeals has only 
fifteen members, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2009), but 114 staff attorneys, known as attorney 
advisors, Komis, supra note 73, at 2. 
 263. See supra note 49. 
 264. EOIR, supra note 5, at Y1 fig.32. 
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downturn, which presumably diminishes the incentive to fight for the 
right to remain at the same time that it renders legal services less 
affordable. If this theory is accurate, then future economic recovery 
could restore the appeal rate to its historic levels. Alternatively, 
perhaps the drop in the rate of appeals to the BIA reflects the faster 
BIA turnaround time, which arguably has dampened the incentive to 
file BIA appeals for the purpose of delaying removal. If so, then any 
increase in the future appellate turnaround time could trigger a rise in 
the appeal rate. Still another possibility is that immigration judges, 
stung by the criticisms of their inconsistent asylum approval rates, 
have responded with more favorable asylum rulings, in which event 
one would expect the pool of asylum denials to decrease generally 
and, moreover, for those asylum applications that immigration judges 
deny to be less likely to contain a basis for appeal. In that scenario, a 
future decrease in immigration judges’ asylum approval rates could 
raise the rate of appeals. Finally, as Professor Lenni Benson has 
suggested, perhaps the drop in the rate of appeals reflects an increase 
in the number of in absentia removal orders entered by immigration 
judges. In absentia orders are less likely to be appealed because the 
immigrant might not learn of the order in time to appeal.265 If so, then 
a change in the proportion of in absentia orders could trigger a 
corresponding change in the appeal rates. 
The relevant question, however, is not whether the rates of 
appeals from the decisions of immigration judges or their successors 
are likely to increase or decrease in the future. Rather, the critical 
question is whether the rate of appeals is likely to be greater if the 
BIA is replaced by the proposed Court of Appeals for Immigration 
than it would be if appeals remain with the BIA. The answer to that 
question is uncertain. On the one hand, perhaps the drop in the rate 
of appeals to the BIA from 2004 to 2008 reflects a lack of confidence 
in that tribunal; based on that assumption, substituting an Article III 
court for the BIA might increase the rate of future appeals. That 
causal link seems shaky, however. The two major events that might 
be expected to have diminished immigrants’ confidence in the BIA 
were the 2002 BIA procedural reforms and the purge of the more 
immigrant-friendly BIA members in 2003. As discussed earlier,266 the 
effects of that loss of confidence manifested themselves in 
dramatically higher rates of petitions for review of BIA decisions 
 
 265. See Benson, supra note 7, at 417. 
 266. See supra notes 105–08. 
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from just before to just after those years—not in the period 2004 to 
2008. There is no evidence that confidence in the BIA further eroded 
during the latter period. 
On the other hand, there are reasons to expect a lower rate of 
appeals under my proposal than under the current system. First, 
converting the current immigration judges, who work under the 
supervision of one of the opposing parties—the U.S. government—
into an independent adjudicatory tribunal should bolster confidence 
in the original decisions.267 Second, those who lack access to counsel 
might find it more intimidating to appeal to a full-fledged federal 
court than to appeal to an administrative tribunal. As discussed in 
Section D.1.c, the goal will be to make the procedures of the new 
court informal and accessible, but whether the perception will track 
the reality is uncertain. I therefore assume that, with a constant 
caseload and constant total staffing, the existing salary structure would 
make review by the proposed Article III immigration court more 
economical than review by the BIA. 
A second, and perhaps even more compelling, source of savings 
is that the proposed bill would reduce the number of appellate rounds 
from two to one. Thus, it is not just a matter of substituting one round 
for a more expensive round; the one round of review would replace a 
more expensive round plus another round. 
The precise amount of savings from eliminating the BIA is hard 
to estimate. Regrettably, EOIR is unable to disaggregate its 
approximately $300 million budget into component units.268 In a 
carefully prepared estimate, however, Russell Wheeler has estimated 
the fiscal year 2010 cost of the BIA at $96 million.269 Even so, he is 
skeptical that these savings would exceed the annual cost of a new 
U.S. Court of Appeals for Immigration, if it is staffed with enough 
judges to handle its expected caseload. He estimates the latter cost at 
between $92 million and $105 million under different sets of 
assumptions,270 and he is very likely right. Again, however, those 
estimates reflect Congress’s historic willingness to give the federal 
 
 267. Judge Marks has offered a variant of this argument. She has suggested that restoring 
the independence of the immigration judges (through creation of an Article I immigration 
court) should enhance immigrants’ confidence in the original decisions, thus decreasing the rate 
of appeals from the BIA (or a successor tribunal) to the courts of appeals. Marks, supra note 7, 
at 4. 
 268. Komis, supra note 73, at item 11. 
 269. Wheeler, supra note 170, at 1862. 
 270. Id. at 1862–63. 
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courts more resources per case than the BIA. If the cost per case is 
currently lower at the BIA than it is in the courts of appeals, it is 
because of conscious policy choices. For a given caseload per judge 
and a given ratio of law clerks and staff attorneys to judges—which I 
maintain is the relevant consideration—it remains true that BIA 
adjudication is more expensive than federal court adjudication 
because of the salary structures just discussed. A fortiori, the 
combination of BIA adjudication and federal court adjudication is 
more expensive than the latter would be if it were the sole round of 
appellate review. 
At any rate, the present proposal contains a third source of cost 
savings. One fewer round of adjudication also means fewer 
prosecutorial expenses. The annual salary range of the ICE assistant 
chief counsels who currently represent the government in BIA 
appeals is $49,544 to $127,604,271 plus locality pay.272 There are 712 
full-time equivalent ICE assistant chief counsels handling removal 
hearings and BIA appeals, and the bulk of their time is spent on 
removal hearings before the immigration judges.273 Under the present 
proposal, that use of their time would not change, but they would no 
longer need to spend additional time on BIA appeals. Wheeler 
predicts that, even if the Justice Department no longer prosecutes 
BIA appeals, it would argue that its current staffing levels will still be 
required for other immigration-related matters.274 I agree. If that 
prediction pans out, however, it would not destroy anticipated 
savings. It would mean only that the resources saved from the 
elimination of BIA appeals could be reallocated to more productive 
work, such as litigating the appeals that would now be filed in the new 
appeals court. At present, 239 attorneys situated in the Justice 
Department’s Office of Immigration Litigation, with average annual 
salaries of $123,000, litigate immigration cases in the federal courts.275 
 
 271. The pay grades of the ICE assistant chief counsels range from GS-11, step 1 to GS-15, 
step 10. E-mail from Peter Vincent, supra note 10. Effective January 2009, the annual salaries 
for those ranks are $49,544 and $127,604, respectively. U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., SALARY 
TABLE 2009-GS (2009), available at http://opm.gov/flsa/oca/09tables/pdf/gs.pdf. 
 272. See U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., COMPLETE SET OF LOCALITY PAY TABLES (2009), 
available at http://opm.gov/flsa/oca/09tables/pdf/saltbl.pdf. 
 273. E-mail from Peter Vincent, supra note 10. 
 274. Wheeler, supra note 170, at 1863. 
 275. Telephone Interview with Juan P. Osuna, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Div., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 26, 2009). 
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Fourth, as discussed later in this Section, the elimination of one 
appellate round would shorten the elapsed time from the start of 
removal proceedings to the finish. In fiscal year 2008, some 48 percent 
of all the immigrants in completed removal proceedings were being 
detained at government expense.276 As noted later in this Section, the 
average elapsed time for BIA appeals in which the immigrants are 
detained is ninety-five days. Thus, the dropoff in elapsed time from 
eliminating the BIA would reduce detention costs significantly. 
This cost analysis is crude, but it suggests that the proposal would 
substantially reduce the total fiscal cost of appellate review of 
removal orders. What could be done with these cost savings? One 
option is to do nothing. The consolidation could simply be conceived 
as a cost-cutting device or as a way to free up funds for unrelated 
national needs. My view is that even under that approach the other 
benefits described in this Section would make the immigration 
adjudication system stronger than it is today. Given the extreme 
underfunding of the system, however, increasing the numbers of both 
adjudicators and law clerks should be a high priority. The high stakes 
for both the individuals and the general public demand no less. The 
hope, therefore, would be that the savings from the elimination of the 
BIA and other associated reductions in expenditures would be 
reinvested in either the Office of Administrative Law Judges, the 
United States Court of Appeals for Immigration, or both. 
It is possible, as Wheeler points out, that Congress would be 
stingier in providing resources for a freestanding immigration 
adjudication system than the Department of Justice currently is in 
allocating resources to EOIR.277 Precisely the opposite, however, is 
also possible. Much would depend on the compositions of the 
particular Congresses and the particular administrations in power at 
given times. Considering the Justice Department’s law enforcement 
mission, I am not convinced that there exist systematic institutional 
reasons to expect the former scenario to occur more frequently than 
the latter. 
Finally, I cannot claim that these savings alone would be enough 
to raise the quality of the immigration adjudication system to an 
acceptable level. The current underresourcing is so severe that a more 
realistic funding level would be required under any set of reforms. 
But even the revenue-neutral approach described here would permit 
 
 276. EOIR, supra note 5, at O1 fig.23. 
 277. Wheeler, supra note 170, at 1853–54. 
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significant enhancements. The funds could be redirected to increasing 
the number of adjudicators or increasing the number of law clerks at 
either the trial level, the appellate level, or both. At the appellate 
level, an enlarged corps of either adjudicators or law clerks could be 
directed toward reducing individual caseloads or expanding the use of 
multimember panels, or both. I express no view here regarding the 
optimal use of those funds; I suggest only that any of these strategies 
would restore some of the lost quality to the immigration adjudication 
system. Instead of two highly flawed rounds of review in which 
appellate authorities are forced to decide cases after little more than 
quick glances at the files and dangerous shortcuts, Congress should 
redirect the same funds (and ideally additional funds) to a single 
round of high-quality review. 
5. Elapsed Time.  By eliminating one step in the process, this 
proposal would do more than save money. It would also reduce the 
elapsed time from the start of proceedings to their conclusion. 
Elapsed time is important for several reasons. As previously noted, 48 
percent of the immigrants in removal proceedings are detained 
pending final determinations.278 EOIR prioritizes these cases,279 but 
priorities that encompass almost one-half of the cases can have only 
limited effects. Former BIA Chair Juan Osuna has noted that BIA 
policy is to decide all appeals involving detained immigrants within 
150 days and has said that, in practice, appeals by detained 
immigrants have taken an average of ninety-five days to complete.280 
Eliminating BIA review would thus save substantial time. Reducing 
time in detention, in turn, has obvious benefits. In addition to 
reducing fiscal costs and minimizing the loss of individual liberty, 
decreasing detention times would free up beds that could be used for 
immigrants who are most likely either to abscond or to threaten 
public safety. 
Moreover, whether an immigrant is in detention or not, delay is 
detrimental to the public interest. If the individual is indeed 
deportable, and is either ineligible for, or undeserving of, 
 
 278. See supra text accompanying note 276. 
 279. See Maria Baldini-Potermin, Practice Before the Board of Immigration Appeals: Recent 
Roundtable and Additional Practice Tips, 86 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2009, 2010 (2009) 
(summarizing information shared by Juan Osuna, the then-chair of the BIA); cf. Komis, supra 
note 73, at 4 (listing variables, including detention, that affect the processing times for removal 
proceedings). 
 280. Baldini-Potermin, supra note 279, at 2010. 
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discretionary relief, the public has an interest in speeding removal. If 
the person is detained, delay increases the public cost. If the person is 
at large, that person’s continued presence in the United States is 
detrimental to the public interest for whatever reasons prompted 
Congress to make the particular conduct a ground for deportation. 
Conversely, if the removal order is ultimately determined to be 
erroneous and the individual in fact has a legal right to remain, the 
person deserves freedom as soon as possible. Either way, delay is 
harmful. 
6. Flexibility.  The variability of appellate caseloads demands 
flexibility in the system for assigning judges to cases. Appellate 
caseloads fluctuate for numerous reasons.281 The total number of 
appealable trial-level decisions can increase or decrease with changes 
in migration flows or changes in the law enforcement priorities of 
particular administrations. Thus, even a constant rate of appeal will 
lead to either more or fewer total appeals. The rate of appeal can also 
change. The resources allocated to the trial phase of the process, as 
well as the composition of the trial bench, might influence the 
outcomes of trial-level decisions or the parties’ perceptions of either 
the accuracy of those outcomes or the fairness of the procedures. Any 
of these factors has the potential to alter the parties’ inclinations to 
appeal. Consequently, long-term future immigration appellate 
caseloads are impossible to predict. 
Flexibility, therefore, is critical. A court staffed by specialized 
Article I judges would be hard pressed to supply that flexibility, 
because specialist adjudicators are not easily transferred to other 
adjudicative roles. The same would be true if an immigration 
appellate court were staffed by specialized Article III judges who 
were originally appointed specifically to that court and permanently 
assigned there. The present proposal, in contrast, offers the requisite 
flexibility. If future immigration appellate caseloads substantially 
decline, fewer judges would be designated for the temporary 
assignments to the new court, and at any rate those already assigned 
would soon return to their district or regional appellate courts. 
7. Centralization.  The effects that have been described to this 
point—the depoliticization of the entire adjudication process, the 
retention of both generalist and specialist insights at the appellate 
 
 281. See supra notes 263–67 and accompanying text. 
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level, the cost savings and efficiencies, the speeding of the process, 
and the flexibility of arrangements—have all been presented as 
important benefits of the proposed restructuring. One other element 
of this proposal, appellate centralization, has more mixed effects. At 
present, all appeals go to a single tribunal (the BIA), and some of 
them are further reviewed by a network of nationally dispersed courts 
of appeals. My proposal would direct all appeals to a single 
centralized court. Centralization would bring additional benefits, but 
it would also impose costs. 
On the benefit side, routing all appeals to the same court would 
theoretically promote uniform outcomes. When the regional courts of 
appeals share jurisdiction over the same subject matter, as they do 
today, splits of authority inevitably occur. To that extent, the 
principle of equal treatment for similarly situated individuals is 
sacrificed. In immigration law, a field in which courts like to 
emphasize the importance of the nation speaking with a single voice, 
divergent outcomes are sometimes assumed to have adverse foreign 
policy implications.282 In asylum cases, the extreme inconsistency that 
recent empirical studies have revealed provides another reason to 
seek out centralizing influences.283 
Still, I resist the temptation to tout the uniformity benefits of my 
proposal. Though the immigration opinions of the various regional 
courts of appeals can indeed diverge, the same is true of all the other 
subject areas over which those courts have jurisdiction. There is no 
reason to expect greater divergence in immigration than in other 
areas. The notion that divergence is especially problematic in 
immigration cases because of their potential to affect foreign relations 
is plausible in theory, but I have argued in a different context that the 
likelihood of a given immigration case interfering significantly with 
U.S. foreign relations is highly remote in practice.284 And although the 
inconsistency in the asylum context is quite real, there is little 
likelihood that divisions among the circuits on questions of law are 
 
 282. To hold that the federal government (not the states) has the exclusive power to 
regulate immigration, for example, the Supreme Court has extolled the importance of 
nationwide uniformity. See, e.g., Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1876) (arguing 
that the immigration laws should be the same in all cities); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 
279–80 (1876) (arguing that a lack of uniformity in immigration laws could result in one state  
embroiling the entire nation in disputes with other nations). 
 283. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 284. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary 
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 261–69. 
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major culprits. First, the asylum inconsistencies have occurred within 
the same circuits and even among judges within the same immigration 
courts.285 Further, the main issues in asylum cases have been fact 
questions—in particular, assessments of the applicants’ credibility—
not questions of law that can generate circuit splits.286 
Moreover, circuit splits can have positive benefits. They can 
foster healthy discussions of opposing viewpoints and a productive 
maturation process. They can also help avoid dangerous 
concentrations of power in a single body.287 In addition, circuit splits 
can prompt definitive, authoritative rulings from the Supreme Court. 
Substituting a single appellate court sacrifices these advantages to 
some extent. 
Another cost of centralization is that oral argument will be less 
practicable when counsel lives far away. A system of dispersed courts 
reduces the average time, distance, and cost of travel for counsel. 
Because the present proposal calls for temporary assignments of 
district and circuit judges to a new immigration court, the assigned 
judges would either have to move temporarily to a new location, 
travel periodically to the immigration court, or forgo personal 
interaction with their colleagues on the new court and with counsel. 
Moving one’s residence for two years would disrupt the personal lives 
of many judges, traveling periodically to the court adds fiscal costs, 
and dispensing with either panel deliberations or oral argument 
would diminish the quality of the appellate process. 
My view is that some of these disadvantages are minor and that 
the others are easily remedied. In the present context, the dangerous 
concentration of power in a single court is less serious than it first 
appears. First, the status quo effectively embodies the same feature. 
The vast majority of BIA decisions are never appealed; thus, the BIA 
typically has the last word.288 Even when a BIA decision is challenged 
 
 285. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 328–39. Because the petition for review must 
be filed in the circuit in which the removal hearing was held, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2006), 
circuit splits would not explain these inconsistencies. 
 286. See Palmer, supra note 38, at 977. 
 287. See S. Rep. No. 111-101, at 23–26 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/ 
2009_rpt/whistle.pdf (expressing dissatisfaction with restrictive interpretations of the 
Whistleblower Protection Act by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has 
exclusive jurisdiction, and proposing to extend jurisdiction to other courts). 
 288. As noted earlier, immigrants petition for review in approximately 30 percent of BIA 
decisions. See supra note 49. 
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in court, the combination of Chevron deference289 to BIA 
interpretations of law and the limited scope of judicial review on 
questions of fact and discretion290 results in a highly concentrated BIA 
power not only to decide cases but also to shape future law. As a 
result, the proposed centralization of judicial review would alter the 
extent of the concentration of adjudicatory power only marginally. 
Second, even if there is only one court, the heavy volume of 
immigration appeals virtually guarantees that the decisions of the new 
court would be diffused among a large number of judges, presumably 
spanning a broad ideological spectrum. 
As for the logistics, it must be remembered that the current BIA 
sits in only one location, and not a very central location at that: Falls 
Church, Virginia. Again, however, only a minority of the BIA 
decisions are further appealed. The proposed restructuring would 
therefore leave the appellate tribunal only marginally less accessible 
than it is today—perhaps even more accessible if the court is situated 
nearer to the geographic center of the United States and definitely 
more accessible if, as suggested below, the court sits in multiple 
venues. With respect to oral argument, the new arrangement also 
concedes very little, because the BIA heard oral argument in only one 
case in fiscal year 2009.291 Again, given that only a minority seeks 
further review of BIA decisions, the vast majority of immigrants who 
appeal immigration judge decisions receives no oral argument at all 
under the current structure. 
My proposal would allow the new court to formulate its own 
criteria for oral argument, based on resources, caseload, and any 
other relevant factors. If the judges choose to remain based in their 
home cities rather than move temporarily to the site of the new court, 
they could bunch the cases that require oral argument and travel 
periodically to the new court to hear them. Judges of the regional 
courts of appeals must currently do precisely that, and several circuits 
encompass vast geographic areas. The Ninth Circuit ranges from 
Hawaii to Alaska to Arizona, the Eighth Circuit from North Dakota 
to Arkansas, the Tenth Circuit from Wyoming to Oklahoma. With 
only one centralized appellate court, the travel distances admittedly 
 
 289. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 841, 862–63 (1984). 
 290. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (making BIA factfinding “conclusive unless any reasonable 
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” and the attorney general’s 
discretion regarding relief “conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of 
discretion”). 
 291. Komis, supra note 73, at 3. 
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would be even greater, but that marginal difference must be balanced 
against the reality that, for the vast majority of BIA litigants, there is 
currently no oral argument at any stage of the appellate process. 
Indeed, as a result of the current restrictions on judicial review,292 
many litigants lack access not only to oral argument but also to any 
judicial review at all. The proposed restructuring would plug that gap. 
Finally, if either travel logistics or the concentration of 
adjudicatory power in a single court is nonetheless considered 
problematic, Congress can choose to situate the new court in multiple 
cities (perhaps three). Judges might be more inclined to relocate 
temporarily if given a choice of cities. Even if they choose not to 
relocate, a thoughtful selection of venues would reduce travel times 
for both judges and counsel. The resulting travel burdens would thus 
approach, if not quite equal, those which they experience today for 
oral argument in the various regional courts of appeals. If Congress 
were to establish multiple sites, it would have at least two options. It 
could create multiple U.S. Courts of Appeals for Immigration, 
empowering each to develop its own precedents, as the regional 
courts of appeals now do, or it could simply establish multiple venues 
for the same court, in much the same way each regional court of 
appeals now operates internally. The former arrangement would 
better address the dangerous concentration of power problem, and 
either arrangement would ease the travel burdens for oral argument 
or for panel deliberation. There are alternative solutions to the 
logistical issues as well. One option is for the judges to ride circuit 
when the occasion so demands. Videoconferencing and other 
technology could address some of the distance issues. 
8. Potential for Consensus.  It is perhaps naïve to expect any 
meaningful reform of immigration adjudication to command 
consensus in the present highly charged partisan climate. This 
proposal, however, presents tradeoffs that the typical opposing sides 
in this debate might find worthwhile. In exchange for minor sacrifices, 
each side would achieve what is most important to it. 
Those who tend to prioritize the interests of the immigrant 
should be pleased with the decisional independence for immigration 
judges. Moreover, instead of appellate review by an administrative 
tribunal whose members are appointed by, and restrained by, the 
attorney general, there is a right of review by Article III judges with 
 
 292. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2); see also supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
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real independence. In the process, the 1996 court-stripping legislation 
would be effectively neutralized, because there would be a right of 
review by Article III judges in all removal cases. There are also the 
combined benefits of specialized expertise and a generalist 
perspective at the appellate level, again for all cases. 
Those who generally prioritize the interests of the government 
should similarly be receptive, because this proposal offers much of 
what they have long said they want. With only one appellate round 
rather than two, the process is shorter and cheaper. The 
neutralization of the 1996 court stripping should not be troubling, 
because review by the new court in those cases will simply replace 
BIA review of those cases. Instead of every party having a right to 
one round of review and some having the right to a second round, 
every party will be limited to one round. The elimination of the 
second round not only saves taxpayer funds, but also reduces the 
delays that some believe incentivize frivolous appeals.293 
I predict that the federal judges themselves will be less than 
enthusiastic about this proposal, at least initially. Some might 
specifically dislike immigration cases. Specific likes and dislikes aside, 
federal judges did not sign up to be specialists. Part of the lure of the 
job might well have been the interesting diversity of subject matter to 
which their cases would expose them. Still, at present, the circuit 
judges bear the entire responsibility for deciding immigration 
appeals;294 my proposal would distribute the immigration caseload 
more equitably among the district judges and circuit judges. 
Moreover, even those judges who are assigned to the new 
immigration court despite a preference to be elsewhere will not 
necessarily be hearing more immigration cases than they would 
otherwise hear. They will simply be hearing the immigration cases in 
a more compressed time frame. Finally, those who specialize in 
immigration law know firsthand the fascinations of this extraordinary 
field. After significant exposure to immigration law and an 
opportunity to master its nuances, many of the judges who would not 
 
 293. As Wheeler points out, the creation of new federal judgeships, with the resulting 
opportunity for one president to substantially alter the composition of the federal bench, could 
pose particular political problems in an era of intense congressional partisanship.  Wheeler, 
supra note 170, at 1863–64.  As he further notes, however, an omnibus judge bill might attract 
bipartisan support if the effective date is deferred to the start of the next presidential term and 
the bill is voted on before anyone could reliably predict the outcome of the next presidential 
race.  Id. at 1863. 
 294. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
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have chosen two-year rotations to an immigration appeals court 
undoubtedly will develop a new appreciation for the subject matter 
and genuine fulfillment in their experiences. 
No one could responsibly argue that the BIA has contributed 
nothing to the immigration adjudication process. It has disposed of 
large numbers of cases cheaply and speedily, and in the process it has 
provided twenty-five volumes of published precedent decisions295 that 
have guided immigration judges and administrative officials for 
seventy years.296 The question I pose, however, is whether the value 
added by the BIA can match the gains from redirecting the funds 
currently spent on two badly underresourced rounds of appellate 
review into a single round of careful, high-quality review by 
independent judges who combine specialist and generalist 
perspectives. I believe it cannot and thus favor the consolidation the 
proposal offered here would permit. 
D. The Details 
At the request of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, 
Refugees and Border Security, I have prepared a draft bill that would 
embody the proposal made in this Article.297 For the trial phase, the 
more significant details of the draft bill concern the appointments of 
the adjudicators, their jurisdiction, and the trial procedures. For the 
appellate phase, the main details relate to the assignments of the 
judges, their jurisdiction, the scope of review, the appellate 
procedures, filing deadlines, and stays of removal pending review. 
1. The Trial Phase 
a. Appointments of Adjudicators.  The draft bill would establish, 
as an independent executive branch tribunal outside all departments 
of government, the Office of the Administrative Law Judges for 
Immigration (OALJI). In most respects, this office is analogous to the 
existing Office of the Chief Immigration Judge. The president would 
appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Chief 
 
 295. See EOIR, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Virtual Law Library, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ 
libindex.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010) (containing published BIA decisions). 
 296. See Regulations Governing Departmental Organization and Authority, 5 Fed. Reg. 
3502, 3503 (Sept. 4, 1940) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003) (creating the BIA); 
Legomsky, supra note 6, at 1380 n.488 (noting that no attorney general had ever removed a BIA 
member). 
 297. The draft bill is on file with the Duke Law Journal and is available on request. 
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Administrative Law Judge for Immigration (CALJI), to serve for a 
term of seven years. Instead of immigration judges, there would be 
Administrative Law Judges for Immigration (ALJIs). They would be 
based in various district offices around the country, just as the 
immigration judges now are. 
The existing immigration judges would generally be 
grandfathered into the new ALJI positions, as has been done in some 
analogous contexts.298 Other staff would be similarly grandfathered. 
The bad apple problem discussed in Part II.B.4, however, requires a 
difficult judgment call. Grandfathering everyone would extend 
functional life tenure even to those current immigration judges whose 
behavior renders them unfit to wield adjudicatory power. There is a 
tension between the need to weed out those individuals and the 
potential for selective grandfathering based on ideology. Absent 
evidence that the bad apples number more than a few, one alternative 
is simply to accept these few as a tradeoff for avoiding the dangers of 
politicized selections. But that tradeoff would offer little solace for 
the immigrants who appear before those problematic adjudicators. 
The compromise I propose is to subject the grandfathering to a 
specific exclusion for any current immigration judges whom a special 
commission identifies as having exhibited patterns of incompetence, 
bias, or unprofessional conduct. The judge in question would then 
have the right to an evidentiary hearing before, and a de novo 
determination by, the Merit Systems Protection Board. 
The biggest changes for the trial-level adjudicators would be 
those designed to assure their decisional independence and more 
generally to depoliticize the adjudication process. The changes would 
be reflected in the adjudicators’ organizational locations, 
appointments, and terms of office. After the initial grandfathering, 
the process for future appointments would be a slightly modified 
version of thoughtful proposals by the ABA Commission on 
Immigration and by Philip Schrag and Marshall Fitz. Both proposals 
call for an independent committee that would recommend trial judge 
candidates to the chief trial judge; under those proposals, the latter 
would then make the final selections from the recommended list. 
Congress would prescribe certain minimum qualifications (U.S. 
citizenship, Bar membership, and certain experience requirements). 
 
 298. See Marks, supra note 7, at 17 & n.89 (citing Tax Court judges and Court of Claims 
judges as examples). 
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Beyond those minimum credentials, the committee would be 
encouraged to consider a range of other statutorily specified factors.299 
Rather than confine this committee to a purely advisory role, 
however, I would have it appoint the candidates directly. Its size and 
diversity render unlikely the chance that candidates with extremist 
views, problematic credentials, or difficult personalities will be 
appointed. The alternative of allowing a single chief immigration 
judge to select from a list of candidates—even if all are well 
qualified—would give that one individual a broad power to shape the 
long-term ideological composition of the immigration bench. 
Once ALJIs are in office, I would give the CALJI the power to 
reassign them to different district offices as caseloads change,300 but 
only for reasons of efficiency, not as a form of discipline. The ALJIs’ 
terms of office would be the same as for most other ALJs; they could 
be removed only for good cause and only after a Merit Systems 
Protection Board hearing.301 
b. Jurisdiction.  Immigration judges currently have jurisdiction 
over removal hearings, including the authority to decide almost all 
applications for affirmative relief commonly sought during removal 
proceedings.302 They have jurisdiction over a few miscellaneous 
decisions as well.303 The draft bill generally grants the same authority 
to the ALJIs, but in somewhat more generic language and with a 
specific change to the adjustment of status procedures.304 
 
 299. See ABA, supra note 215, at 10–13; COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 69; 
Fitz & Schrag, supra note 7, § 103(g). 
 300. The chief immigration judge currently enjoys a similar power to detail immigration 
judges to locations with more pressing needs. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. 
GAO-06-771, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW: CASELOAD PERFORMANCE 
REPORTING NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 17–19 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d06771.pdf. 
 301. See supra note 198. 
 302. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a)(1) (2009). For more detail, see supra text accompanying notes 12–
23. 
 303. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (review of ICE bond decisions); id. § 1003.23 (motions to reopen 
or reconsider); id. § 1003.26 (in absentia hearings); id. § 1003.29 (continuances); id. § 1003.42 
(review of credible fear determinations); id. § 1003.106 (practitioner discipline); id. 
§ 1245.13(n)(2)–(3) (rescission of adjustment of status). 
 304. Rather than attempt to list all the various affirmative relief applications that may be 
filed in removal proceedings, the draft bill defines the ALJIs’ jurisdiction more generically to 
include all requests for relief or protection that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
makes available to noncitizens who are inadmissible or deportable. In addition, the draft bill 
addresses a nagging problem. At present, the immigration judge has the authority to decide 
adjustment of status applications that are filed during removal proceedings. Id. § 1245.2(a)(1). 
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c. Procedures.  A few procedural rules that currently govern 
removal proceedings are statutory.305 The proposed bill generally 
leaves those rules intact. Most of the current procedural rules, 
however, are embodied in the attorney general’s regulations.306 The 
draft bill takes an analogous approach. It establishes an Executive 
Committee composed of the chief ALJI and four senior ALJIs, and 
authorizes it to formulate rules of procedure, adapting the notice-and-
comment requirements generally applicable to judicial rulemaking.307 
It enumerates several specific issues that the rules must address, 
including venue, admissibility of evidence, authorization to practice 
before ALJIs, and discipline of practitioners. To preserve the relative 
informality of the process, the draft bill requires that the 
representation rules provide for nonlawyers and that the evidentiary 
rules accommodate the high percentage of pro se cases. The draft bill 
also requires the ALJIs to follow the precedent decisions of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for Immigration (and the preenactment precedent 
decisions of the relevant court of appeals). 
One provision of the draft bill would prohibit ex parte 
communications between an ALJI and a party (or counsel) 
concerning a pending case. As noted earlier, the attorney general’s 
current Rules of Conduct for both immigration judges and BIA 
members expressly allow such ex parte communications with Justice 
Department personnel, and in at least one highly publicized incident, 
the former INS successfully communicated ex parte with the chief 
immigration judge.308 There is no way to know how many other ex 
parte communications have taken place. In the interest of fairness to 
both parties, the proposed provision would expressly prohibit that 
practice. 
 
But adjustment of status usually requires approval of a visa petition, which only DHS—not the 
immigration judge—currently has the authority to decide. Id. § 204.1(e)(1).To prevent the 
immigration judge from granting adjustment of status, DHS often deliberately refrains from 
acting on the visa petition. As a result, immigration judges have frequently had to grant multiple 
continuances while they wait for DHS to act on the visa petitions, thus delaying removal 
hearings for long periods of time. See, e.g., LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 68, at 666 
(excerpting an unpublished decision in which a judge criticizes INS delay). To cure that 
problem, this subsection would give the immigration judge the authority to decide any family-
related visa petition on which an adjustment of status application filed during removal 
proceedings depends. 
 305. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006). 
 306. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240. 
 307. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–72 (2006). 
 308. See supra notes 150–52, 189 and accompanying text. 
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Current law requires the attorney general to issue regulations 
spelling out the contempt powers of immigration judges.309 To date, 
however, the attorney general has not done so, apparently because 
the former INS did not want its trial attorneys subject to discipline by 
other Department of Justice attorneys, even if the latter are judges.310 
Thus, immigration judges have had difficulty getting government 
attorneys to meet deadlines; this difficulty has slowed final 
dispositions.311 The draft bill fills that gap, conferring contempt 
authority directly in language drawn partly from that used for judges 
of the Tax Court.312 The same proposed provision clarifies that 
government actors and private actors alike are subject to the 
contempt power. 
2. The Appellate Phase 
a. Assignments of Judges.  The draft bill would replace both the 
BIA and the current role of the regional courts of appeals in 
immigration cases with a new Article III U.S. Court of Appeals for 
Immigration (CAI). The president, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, would appoint a chief judge of the CAI for a term of seven 
years. Each circuit would assign both circuit and district judges to sit 
on the new court for two-year terms.313 If the draft bill becomes law, 
Congress would need to enact subsequent legislation specifying the 
number of judges it wishes to authorize for the new court, as well as 
any corresponding adjustments Congress wishes to make to the 
number of authorized judgeships for the existing courts of appeals 
and district courts. These adjustments would compensate those courts 
for the judges they would be lending to the new court while 
accounting for the corresponding reductions in the caseloads of the 
 
 309. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1). 
 310. See Marks, supra note 7, at 10 (“[I]t was discovered that the Attorney General had 
failed to [issue regulations] in large part [] because the INS objected to having its attorneys 
subjected to contempt provisions by ‘other attorneys within the Department,’ even if the 
attorneys do serve as judges.” (quoting KEENER & SLAVIN, supra note 187, at 87)). 
 311. See Immigration Reform and the Reorganization of Homeland Defense, supra note 187, 
at 75–76 (recommending that the INS be required to “meet timely pre-trial deadlines . . . or 
notify the court and parties of delays”); KEENER & SLAVIN, supra note 187, at 87 (discussing 
delay by the INS). 
 312. See 26 U.S.C. § 7456 (2006) (administration of oaths and procurement of testimony in 
the Tax Court). 
 313. To stagger the appointments in a way that would avoid a complete turnover of judges 
every two years, a transition provision prescribes three-year assignments for one-half of the first 
cohort of judges. 
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courts of appeals. To aid Congress in those decisions, the draft bill 
would require the Judicial Conference of the United States to study 
the likely needs of both the new court and the courts from which the 
assigned judges are drawn and report its recommendations to 
Congress by a specified date. 
The draft bill offers a formula for determining how many judges 
each circuit would be required to contribute. Initially, I considered 
proposing that the allocations be proportional to the number of 
immigration judges who sit in each circuit at the date of enactment, 
with periodic future adjustments. My thinking was that the number of 
immigration judges in a circuit provides a rough measure of the 
number of removal cases the circuits would otherwise be receiving, 
and therefore an approximation of the caseload reduction that each 
circuit would experience as a result of the transfer of its cases to the 
new court. This approach is problematic, however, because petitions 
for review of removal cases are filed only in the courts of appeals.314 
Thus, the caseloads of those courts would drop while the district 
courts, which would lose the bulk of the judges, would not experience 
any offsetting caseload reductions. 
Instead, therefore, the proposal would make each circuit’s 
contributions proportional to the number of active Article III circuit 
and district judges in that circuit. The Judicial Council315 of each 
circuit would then select the assigned judges, after a recommendation 
from the chief judge of the court of appeals for the circuit. To 
preserve a generalist perspective, only active Article III judges with at 
least three years of service on federal courts of general jurisdiction 
would be eligible for these two-year assignments. No judge could be 
assigned to more than one two-year assignment without consent, and 
there are special provisions for uncompleted assignments. 
Assignment to the new court would have no effect on a judge’s pay. 
Subject to certain conditions, the draft bill also provides for ad hoc 
assignments of both active and senior district and circuit judges when 
temporary needs arise. 
b. Jurisdiction.  The BIA now has jurisdiction over appeals from 
immigration judge decisions in removal proceedings, as well as 
 
 314. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
 315. The Judicial Council of each circuit comprises the chief judge of the court of appeals 
and some of the district and circuit judges of the circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(1) (2006).  I must 
acknowledge here the logistical and political challenges that the selection of judges would 
inevitably entail.  See Wheeler, supra note 170, at 1849–50, 1863–64. 
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jurisdiction over a number of miscellaneous matters.316 In substituting 
the CAI for both the BIA and the regional courts of appeals, the draft 
bill would confer on the new court a jurisdiction roughly similar to 
that of the current BIA. The practical effect would be to restore the 
most important Article III appellate jurisdiction Congress stripped 
away in 1996—review of most discretionary decisions and review of 
orders removing most criminal offenders.317 Both the immigrant and 
the government would have the right to appeal. The CAI would also 
have the discretion to accept jurisdiction over issues that ALJIs 
certify to it. 
c. Scope of Review.  At present, the BIA reviews immigration 
judge decisions de novo, except that it may not set aside findings of 
fact unless they are “clearly erroneous.”318 The statutory provisions on 
the scope of review by the courts of appeals are both more complex 
and more unusual. The reviewing court may set aside an 
administrative finding of fact only if “any reasonable adjudicator 
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”319 An exclusion 
decision “is conclusive unless manifestly contrary to law.”320 A 
decision to deny asylum in the exercise of discretion (as distinguished 
from a finding that the applicant is statutorily ineligible for asylum) is 
“conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of 
discretion.”321 There is no provision that spells out the standard of 
review of those other discretionary decisions for which review is not 
barred. A finding that corroborating evidence was available to an 
asylum applicant but not produced must stand unless “a reasonable 
 
 316. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2009) (establishing the appellate jurisdiction of the BIA). 
 317. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, div. C, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-608 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)–(C) (2006)). The draft bill does not disturb some of the other current 
restrictions on judicial review, such as the limitations on review of in absentia orders, see 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(D), the bars on challenging removal orders via habeas corpus, injunctions, 
class actions, and other alternatives to petitions for review, see id. § 1252(a)(5); id. § 1252(b)(9); 
id. § 1252(f), the limitations on review of expedited removal orders, see id. § 1252(a)(2)(A); id. 
§ 1252(e), and the bar on challenging asylum denials based on missed filing deadlines, see id. 
§ 1158(a)(3). Similarly, the draft bill does not alter the various special removal procedures 
sprinkled throughout the Immigration and Nationality Act. See generally LEGOMSKY & 
RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 68, at 806–15 (describing the exceptions to the usual removal 
procedures, such as for expedited removal, criminal cases, and in absentia hearings). 
 318. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3). 
 319. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 
 320. Id. § 1252(b)(4)(C). 
 321. Id. § 1252(b)(4)(D). 
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trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence 
is unavailable.”322 
These latter rules, apart from being needlessly complex and 
difficult to interpret, reflect Congress’s intentions to narrow the 
judicial role. These rules were enacted, however, in a world in which 
the courts of appeals review final orders after the BIA has already 
reviewed those same orders. With the abolition of the BIA, the new 
CAI would provide the only opportunity for appellate review of the 
trial-level removal orders. The draft bill therefore prescribes the 
familiar standards generally applicable to judicial review of formal 
administrative decisions—the substantial evidence standard for 
findings of fact, the “arbitrary, capricious, [or otherwise] an abuse of 
discretion” standard for discretionary decisions, and de novo review 
for conclusions of law.323 The draft bill would leave intact the current 
provision confining the reviewing court to the administrative record.324 
d. Procedures.  The federal Rules Enabling Act already 
authorizes all courts established by Congress to “prescribe 
[procedural] rules for the conduct of their business.”325 The Judicial 
Conference of the United States reviews those rules for compliance 
with federal law.326 The rulemaking process must include opportunity 
for public notice and comment unless there is an immediate need to 
proceed more quickly.327 Subject to these constraints, the draft bill 
authorizes a majority of the active judges of the CAI to exercise this 
rulemaking power. With the abolition of the BIA, it will become 
important for the CAI to keep the rules simple enough for pro se 
appellants to navigate. For the same reason, the proposed CAI would 
 
 322. Id. § 1252(b)(4). 
 323. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (setting forth the scope of judicial review of agency 
action); ABA, Resolution 114D Adopted by the House of Delegates 4–5 (Feb. 8–9, 2010), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2010/midyear/ daily_jourmal/114D.pdf; COMM’N 
ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 36. Ordinarily, reviewing courts must defer to administrative 
tribunals’ reasonable interpretations of the statutes they administer. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“[A] court may not substitute its own 
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator 
of an agency.”). Because the CAI would itself be a specialized court, however, there is little 
reason for it to accord deference to the legal conclusions of the ALJIs. The draft bill leaves that 
decision to the courts. 
 324. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (limiting review to the administrative record). 
 325. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2006). 
 326. Id. § 331. 
 327. Id. § 2071(e). 
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be wise to permit representation by appropriate categories of 
nonattorneys, as EOIR currently does.328 
e. Filing Deadline.  Current law imposes thirty-day filing 
deadlines for both appeals to the BIA and petitions for review in the 
courts of appeals.329 The draft bill would prescribe a similar thirty-day 
filing deadline for appeals to the CAI, but with one significant 
change. Rather than make the thirty-day deadline absolute, it would 
give the new court the discretion to extend the deadline upon a 
showing of “exceptional circumstances explaining the late filing” or 
otherwise “in the interest of justice.”330 The latter would apply, for 
example, if an appellant could not offer sufficiently compelling 
reasons for missing the deadline but when the facts are so extreme 
that the court regards removal without review as a sanction grossly 
disproportionate to the appellant’s filing error. A request for 
permission to extend the filing deadline, however, would not 
automatically stay removal. 
f. Stays of Removal Pending Judicial Review.  Currently, a 
removal order by an immigration judge is automatically stayed until 
the thirty-day filing deadline for appealing to the BIA has lapsed (or 
appeal has been affirmatively waived). The automatic stay continues 
while a BIA appeal is pending.331 In contrast, an appeal to the BIA of 
an order denying reopening or reconsideration does not stay removal 
unless the BIA in its discretion orders otherwise.332 
Until 1996, somewhat analogous rules applied to petitions for 
review in the courts of appeals. Service of the petition for review 
automatically stayed removal until the court decided the case, unless 
the court directed otherwise.333 Current law reverses that default 
option; a petition for review no longer stays removal unless the court 
in its discretion orders otherwise.334 In Nken v. Holder,335 the Supreme 
 
 328. See 8 C.F.R. § 1292 (2009) (permitting representation by listed categories of 
nonlawyers). 
 329. See id. § 1003.38(b) (addressing appeals to the BIA); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (describing 
petitions for review in the courts of appeals). 
 330. For a somewhat similar recommendation, see ABA, supra note 323, at 7 (proposing a 
sixty-day filing deadline, with the discretion to grant a thirty-day extension upon a showing of 
“excusable neglect or good cause”); COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 37. 
 331. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(a). 
 332. Id. § 1003.6(b). 
 333. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) (1994). 
 334. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (2006). 
LEGOMSKY IN FINAL.DOC 4/28/2010  5:15:26 PM 
2010] IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION 1719 
Court interpreted the statute as contemplating for this purpose the 
traditional test for enforcing orders pending appellate review—a 
balancing test that weighs the likelihood of success on the merits, the 
harm that could result from the denial of a stay, any potential injury 
to the opposing party if a stay is granted, and the public interest.336 
Under the current system, therefore, petitions for review are 
routinely coupled with motions for stays of removal. As a result, the 
court of appeals normally has to review each case twice—once to see 
whether the arguments have enough merit to justify staying removal 
until a final decision can be rendered, and then again, months later, 
when it decides the merits of the case directly. 
Given this inefficiency, there would be strong reasons to return 
to the pre-1996 law even if nothing else were changed. The benefits of 
making that change become even more compelling under the 
proposed bill because current law automatically stays removal 
pending the BIA appeal, and the proposed bill would eliminate BIA 
appeals entirely. Without an automatic stay during appellate review 
by the CAI, therefore, those who challenge their removal orders 
could be erroneously expelled to far corners of the globe without any 
review of their removal orders. For asylum claimants, the dangers are 
even greater. They could be returned erroneously to countries in 
which they face persecution, torture, or even death before any 
tribunal has reviewed the order of removal. Moreover, because the 
consolidation of appellate review from two rounds to one decreases 
the duration of the appellate process, the proposal simultaneously 
reduces the total delay that an immigrant could achieve by exercising 
his or her appellate rights. Again, even with this change, the new 
court would have the discretion to deny a stay pending removal, an 
action it might well be inclined to take in cases of obvious abuse of 
the court process. The only change would be that removal without 
review would require an affirmative act by the court, as it did until 
1996. Further, the proposed stay (with judicial discretion to dissolve 
the stay) would apply only to appeals from removal decisions—not, 
for example, to appeals from denials of motions to reopen or 
reconsider, to the filing of requests for extensions of time in which to 
 
 335. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009). 
 336. See id. at 1760–62. 
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appeal, or, with one minor exception,337 to any of the other 
miscellaneous orders over which the CAI would have jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
Adjudication is one small piece of the immigration puzzle, but it 
is a piece that has suffered from longstanding neglect. The problems 
are serious. They affect the fairness of the procedures, the accuracy 
and consistency of the results, and the acceptability of the system to 
the parties and the public. Inadequate resources, procedural 
shortcuts, politicization, and a few bad apples are at the root of these 
problems. 
Few people today would dispute that the immigration 
adjudication system is fundamentally flawed, but the warring 
ideological camps differ dramatically as to how much different 
problems matter and how best to solve them. My goal is to propose a 
restructuring that would meaningfully address the most worrisome 
deficiencies in a manner that all sides would view as a substantial 
improvement over the status quo. A workable consensus will require 
compromises and concessions from all sides. For this to happen, 
however, a proposed reform will have to enable all sides to meet the 
specific objectives they regard as most compelling, while allowing 
each side to limit its concessions to those it can live with. 
The restructuring proposed here is offered in that spirit. At the 
trial level, it would remove the current corps of immigration judges 
from the Department of Justice and situate them in an independent 
executive branch office. The adjudicators would be ALJs, appointed 
collectively by actors insulated from the political process. They would 
have the job security essential to their decisional independence and 
would be free of day-to-day supervision and control by a department 
whose primary mission is law enforcement. Most of the current 
immigration judges would be grandfathered into the new positions. 
The larger component of the proposed reform is the appellate 
phase. Both the BIA and the current role of the regional courts of 
appeals in immigration cases would be abolished. In their place, the 
proposal would establish an Article III immigration court staffed by 
district and circuit judges on two-year assignments. Judges could not 
 
 337. The one exception would be to allow an automatic stay when an immigrant appeals an 
order rescinding adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1256—again, unless the CAI directs 
otherwise. 
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be assigned to the new court until they had served at least three years 
on federal courts of general jurisdiction. 
The benefits would be ample. At the trial level, it would 
depoliticize (to the extent possible) the hiring, judging, and 
supervision and control of immigration adjudicators. It would 
consolidate the two current, largely duplicative, and badly 
underfunded rounds of appellate review into a single high-quality 
round. In the process, it would restore the Article III jurisdiction that 
Congress stripped away in 1996. The consolidation would save tax 
dollars and speed the removal process. Speeding the process, in turn, 
would not only reduce the fiscal and personal liberty costs associated 
with prolonged detention, but would also diminish what some believe 
is a meaningful incentive to file frivolous appeals to delay removal. 
The proposal would achieve this consolidation without sacrificing 
either specialized expertise or a generalist perspective. Importantly, 
the proposed restructuring would also add flexibility, because the 
district and circuit judges who would be staffing the new court could 
be reassigned to their home courts if caseload fluctuations so require. 
The major disadvantages would be the loss of the productive 
discourse that can result from differences of opinion among appellate 
courts and the concentration of power in a single tribunal. For 
reasons this Article has offered, those disadvantages are minor and 
easily remedied. 
Tensions among the multiple goals of adjudication are inevitable. 
As this proposal illustrates, however, those tensions need be neither 
polarizing nor paralyzing. Efficiency and acceptability can coexist 
peacefully with procedural fairness and substantive justice. In the 
immigration adjudication system, the problem has not been merely 
that some of these objectives have been traded off to promote others. 
Rather, the immigration adjudication system has accomplished the 
improbable feat of simultaneously underserving all of these goals. 
These failings are both needless and unacceptable—the former 
because the present proposal offers a way for all sides to have 90 
percent of their cake and eat it too, the latter because the vital human 
and public interests at stake demand a justice system worthy of its 
name. 
